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I. Introduction  
 
For centuries economists have been preoccupied with the growth of nations, a subject that 
affects, in major ways, the well-being of billions of people across the globe.
1
 From a historical 
perspective the Industrial Revolution in England which marked the beginning of ‘sustained’ 
industrial growth is of central importance. Yet, the emergence of post-industrial societies, the 
problem of deindustrialisation and the development prospects in the Global South, recently 
led to a questioning of a growth oriented historiography which tends to equate development 
with industrialisation.
2
 Cain and Hopkins’s study of British imperialism hereby provides a 
substantial contribution. Emphasising the non-industrial forms of capitalist enterprise, 
particularly those in finance and commercial services, in the economic development of Britain 
and its Empire, their analysis runs against traditional conceptions of the Industrial Revolution. 
While they acknowledge that the process of industrialisation is central to modern British 
history, they argue that the service sector has not received the historical recognition that it 
deserves. In their account of British economic history, the service sector was much more 
important in terms of output and employment before, during and after the Industrial 
Revolution than standard interpretations suggest.
3
  
 
Braudel writes that “the historian has less trouble seeing the hows than the whys and can more 
clearly discern the consequences than the origin of major problems. All the more reason, of 
course, for him to become excited about discovering these origins […].”4 Cain and Hopkins’s 
concept of gentlemanly capitalism provides a powerful ‘why’ when describing Britain’s rise 
to hegemony. Reading ‘British Imperialism’ was indeed exciting and this study therefore 
concerns itself with ‘how’ to study and further test their ‘why’ in a systemic way. The authors 
explain themselves that, “the interesting problem now, in our view, is to unravel the relations 
between finance and industry over the centuries in more detail and with greater subtlety than 
was possible in our study, which of course had to keep other matters in view.”5 I will argue 
that this could be done through the systemic analysis of a product. The commodity chain 
approach hereby provides an analytical political economy tool that allows for the study of the 
interrelated activities of production and services beyond regional restrictions. Such an 
analysis also calls for a re-examination of the commodity chain approach itself which, like 
                                                 
1
 Helpman, Elhanan The Mystery of Economic Growth , pp. ix-x 
2
 Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism 1688-2000, p.36 
3
 Ibid. p.35 
4
 Braudel, Fernand Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, p.80 
5
 Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism 1688-2000, p.8 
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traditional accounts of British economic history, tends to concentrate on industry. This 
represents the second agenda of this paper: exploring the gentlemanly capitalism paradigm 
through the commodity chains approach benefits both concepts. The recognition of the 
importance of services for the ascent of the economy of the first industrial nation also sheds 
new light on debates concerning development and provides a strong case for the firm 
integration of services in commodity chains. Commodity chain research is utilised in many 
different sectors, representing real-use value for formulation of development policy.
6
 This 
underlines the importance to critically engage with the concept.  
 
Half of this study is therefore dedicated to these two theoretical and methodological concepts, 
outlining their argumentations, shortcomings and mutual benefits of improvement. The 
second half of the paper illustrates how commodity chains can test the gentlemanly capitalism 
paradigm in a systemic way through the analysis of two historical indigo commodity chains. 
This structure underlines that indigo hereby only serves as an example. Considering the 
theoretical background provided in this study, almost any other (global) commodity could 
provide critical insights into the forces operating through Cain and Hopkins’s concept of 
gentlemanly capitalism, outlining the intertwined relationship of production and services. The 
fact that indigo’s demand is explicitly linked to the expanding textile industry in Europe and 
thus industrialisation in general does however make it an especially attractive commodity for 
such an undertaking. Additionally, the analysis of indigo allows for a comparison of different 
types of empire, encompassing settler societies in South Carolina and what can be called an 
‘extractive’ colony in Bengal.       
 
Part II. 1. will discuss Cain and Hopkins’s argumentation and the development of 
gentlemanly capitalism. In order to outline the argument, I have drawn a separation between 
‘the Revolutions’ and ‘the Empire’, but the processes described in both parts naturally 
strongly influence each other. This is in line with Cain and Hopkins’s approach which 
allocates the generic causes of British imperialism at the centre. Drawing a line of causation 
from centre to periphery, its consequences are thus described through the British Empire.
7
 
Part II. 2. is dedicated to commodity chain research: after an overview of the concept, 
potential improvements will be discussed. Special attention is, of course, given to services in 
commodity chains. Recent publications have urged to integrate services into commodity chain 
                                                 
6
 Bair, Jennifer Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going Forward, p.161 
7
 Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism 1688-2000,  p.60   
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research. While this is enormously helpful, focus almost exclusively lies on the 
‘contemporary’ dimension, describing that services continuously increase in importance;8 this 
argumentation is however powerfully disputed through Cain and Hopkins’s analysis of 
gentlemanly capitalism itself. Finally, Part III. will provide two case studies centring on the 
production and trade of indigo within the British Empire. After outlining the two indigo 
commodity chains in South Carolina and Bengal, they will be analysed in terms of their 
governance structure. The governance structure gives insight into the relationships between 
actors located at different points in the commodity chains and therefore allows the study of 
how value that is created, appropriated and/or distributed throughout the chain.
9
 Dealing with 
historical commodity chains, value can not simply be outlined in monetary terms or in regard 
to profit. Accurate data is not always available and, more importantly, for a holistic and long-
term perspective of value it is simply not sufficient to for example allocate a certain 
percentage of profit to each sector. I will therefore look at governance through analysing 
informational, political and cultural barriers of entry for different participants of the 
commodity chains.  
 
The framework of this paper only allowed for an analysis that treats London as the end 
destination of indigo in both commodity chains. Focus was given to these chains from a 
perspective of Empire which aims to reconnect the causes at the centre with the developments 
in the periphery.
10
 It would indeed be very beneficial to continue the chains as they make their 
way through London to provincial manufacturers in Britain. After outlining Cain and 
Hopkins’s approaches to the causes of British imperialism however, the indigo commodity 
chains serve to test them in regard to dispersed regions of the British Empire. 
 
                                                 
8
 See for example Brown, Ed, Derudder, Ben, Parnreiter, Christof et al. World City Networks and Global 
Commodity Chains: towards a world-systems’ integration 
9
 Bair, Jennifer Global Capitalism and Commodity Chains: Looking Back, Going Forward, p. 159 
10
 As has been explained, this is in line with Cain and Hopkins’s approach to British imperialism. See Cain, P.J., 
Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism 1688-2000, 60-1 
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II. 1. Imperialism, Gentility and the Service Sector in Britain  
 
Cain and Hopkins’s two volume extensive research of British imperialism first appearance in 
the 1990s sparked a lively debate.
11
 Their concept of gentlemanly capitalism clearly added a 
new dimension to discussions of the British Empire which is unlikely to be ignored by any 
future study of the modern economic history of the United Kingdom or of Greater Britain.
12
 
Nevertheless, services often remain to be seen as a by product of industrial development 
giving them, in the true sense of the word, a 'tertiary' role and ignoring that even 
industrialising Britain was equally a service economy as it was a commodity producing 
economy, making substantial profits through trade, insurance, finance and investment.
13
 This 
indicates that the debate surrounding Cain and Hopkins’s ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ is far from 
over and that, despite the numerous relevant and interesting critical publications, more 
research remains to be done. The following part of the paper will therefore look at Cain and 
Hopkins’s argumentation and the academic debate that has surrounded the gentlemanly 
capitalism paradigm since its appearance nearly thirty years ago.  
 
II. 1. a. The Academic Debate: Capitalism, Imperialism and the Service Sector 
 
The last thirty years have seen a number of interrelated revisions regarding the structure and 
development of British capitalism. Most notably, this involved the literal implications of the 
concept of 'Industrial Revolution'.
14
 The term ‘revolution’ may imply a sudden change, and 
therefore draws attention away from long processes associated with, and more so driving, 
such change. This is not to discredit revolutionary changes brought to production through new 
energy forms. Rather, it stresses that such changes should be integrated into the development 
of capitalism, acknowledging on the one hand, that industry is a phase in a long process of 
what Braudel famously called long durée, and on the other hand, that 'industrialism' itself can 
be seen as a longer and more gradual, continuous process than is implied by the term 
'revolution'.
15
 Braudel underlines that there has never been a total break or an absolute 
                                                 
11
 P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins first jointly written essay on the subject of British Imperialism appeared in 1980, 
followed by two further articles published in 1986 and 1987. Their book was first published in 1993, comprising 
two volumes under the names of “British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688-1914” and “British 
Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction” (Longman, London); the two volumes have since became one and are 
now in their third edition.      
12
 Dumett, Raymond E. (ed.) Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism. The New Debate on Empire, p.4 
13
 Vries, Peer The California School and beyond: how to study the Great Divergence?, p.15 
14
 Ingham, Geoffrey British Capitalism: Empire, Merchants and Decline, p. 339  
15
 Ibid. pp. 340-1; Clark points out that the very term ‘Industrial Revolution’ is a nineteenth-century invention 
coined in France in the 1820s and translated into German by Marx and Engels in the 1840s. In English it was 
  
- 9 - 
 
discontinuity within history: “Thus, many historians […] are now discovering that the 
Industrial Revolution was already putting in its appearance long before the eighteenth 
century.”16 Chapman explains that recent revisions have suggested a more gradual growth in 
the old staples [textile, iron and coal]. This has led to rekindle an interest in some of the 
continuities of economic and social life such as the traditional British interest in trade and 
finance, which was more taken for granted by contemporaries.
17
 Such new found interest 
served to outline the underemphasise of non-industrial form of capitalism in the history of the 
first industrial nation,
18
 prompted a new found interest in the British Empire that stems from 
the centre rather than the periphery, and contributed to Cain and Hopkins’s development of 
the ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ paradigm. 
 
Cain and Hopkins underline that “Britain was the most advanced economic power in Europe 
long before the onset of mechanisation or the beginning of the factory system”. They also 
urge to see the Industrial Revolution as a new phase in what was already a very successful 
and broad-based process of economic development.
19
 More so, they explain that the Industrial 
Revolution took place without any fundamental transformation in the nature of property 
ownership or in the disposition of social or political power.
20
 The proposition that the 
structural element of British social and economic power remained in well-established 
traditional hands, thus proposes a different perspective on power and profitability within the 
first industrial nation. Ultimately, this means a (re-)evaluation of British economic history and 
firmly integrates the British Empire into the story. Such an approach serves to explain, how 
forces in Britain drove and created an international trading system, centred in London, 
mediated through the sterling and tied together by a regime of trade which encouraged 
specialisation, cut transaction costs and created an interlocking system of multilateral 
payments. While commodity imports (such as for example raw materials) and exports (such 
as British manufactures) are the visible part of this panorama, the system was neither 
designed nor impelled by industrial capitalists. The driving agents did not represent the 
manufacturing interest but were what Cain and Hopkins call ‘gentlemanly capitalists’.21 
                                                                                                                                                        
popularised by Arnold Torynbee’s book of 1884. For more information on the history and reason for the 
development of the term see Clark, J.C.D. English Society 1688-1832. Ideology, social structure and political 
practice during the ancient regime, p. 65   
16
 Braudel, Fernand Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, pp.46-7  
17
 Chapman, Stanley Merchant Enterprise in Britain. From the Industrial Revolution to World War I, p.1 
18
 Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism. 1688-2000, p.24 
19
 Ibid. p.51 
20
 Ibid. p.50 
21
 Ibid. p.55 
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Engaged in trade, finance, investment and insurance, they represented a socio-political ruling 
elite which is characterised by a synthesis between the older landed elite of aristocracy and 
gentry with the nouveaux riches of the City of London, controlling the service sector of the 
economy.
22
  
 
On the one hand, Cain and Hopkins propose that Britain’s traditional allocated historical role 
of the ‘workshop of the world’ is therefore flawed and should give way to the proposition that 
Britain was in fact an international service centre.
23
 They argue that the gentlemanly 
capitalists engaged in this ‘service centre’ shaped economic policy at home and abroad.24 
More so, their indirect relationship with the productive forces and their distance to 
engagement in industry also kept them aloof from political struggles with an increasingly 
class conscious work-force and provided them with an opportunity to present themselves 
more easily as natural political leaders.
25
 Generally speaking, manufacturers did therefore 
neither own top-wealth or political power. The few ‘lucky’ exceptions hereby were 
incorporated into the gentlemanly capitalist system, rather than creating or shaping it. Cain 
and Hopkins thus give the majority of industrial capitalist the catchy, if unflattering, label of 
‘the shock troops of capitalism’.26 While the homogeneity of the proposed group of 
‘gentlemanly capitalists’ has been debated, and Cain and Hopkins have at times been accused 
of an ‘industrial minimalist’ approach,27 their concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ has 
certainly contributed to a different perspective on economic development.  
 
It has become clear, that Cain and Hopkins identify several separate but interrelated forms of 
capitalist enterprise which can roughly be separated into agricultural, financial, commercial 
and industrial spheres.
28
 It remains however important to define the use and meanings of key 
terms such as ‘capitalism’ and ‘imperialism’ - grand concepts that often bear ideological 
values and controversy. Historians have repeatedly pointed out that ‘capitalism’ is an 
ambiguous and controversial term, loaded with contemporary and possible anachronistic 
connotations.
29
 Cain and Hopkins are aware themselves that “this study requires the use of 
                                                 
22
 Dumett, Raymond E. (ed.) Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism. The New Debate on Empire, p.5 
23
 Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism. 1688-2000, p.51  
24
 Ibid. p.52 
25
 Ibid. p.51 
26
 Ibid. pp.50-1 
27
 Dumett, Raymond E. (ed.) Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism. The New Debate on Empire, p.6 
28
 Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism. 1688-2000, p.34 
29
 Braudel, Fernand Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, p.45 
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terms which have powerful ideological connotations.”30According to them, attributes that are 
uncontroversial but enter most definitions of capitalism in varying proportions and 
combinations include profit-seeking, individualism, market economy, rational calculation and 
the postponement of present consumption for the sake of future returns.
31
 For Ingham, himself 
very critical of Cain and Hopkins account of British imperialism, capitalism at the most 
abstract and general level refers to “the principles of organisations of a social system in which 
power derives from control of (liquid) monetary or financial resources, which may employ 
labour and invest in fixed capital, buy and sell commodities, be lent at a rate of interest and so 
on.”32  He agrees that there are many different forms of capitalism, and that if one 
predominates, it is appropriate to speak of for example ‘commercial capitalism’ or ‘industrial 
capitalism’, but limits the meaning of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ to “[…] those cultural traits 
which comprise a status group’s claim for ‘gentility’ as a means of distinction and social 
closure”.33 Braudel stresses, however, that the development of capitalism was determined by 
its encounter with social hierarchies.
34
 To him, capitalism only succeeded when it became 
identified with the state and substantial power was transferred to the moneyed elite.
35
  
 
In a European context, this type of alliance can be traced back to Italian City-states such as 
Florence in the late fourteenth century, where “[…] the old feudal nobility and the new 
merchant upper bourgeoisie had become one, forming a moneyed elite that in a logical 
fashion set about gaining political control.”36 When trade shifted to the Atlantic, the 
aristocracy of the Regents in Holland of the seventeenth century, governed to the benefit and 
even according to directives of the businessmen, merchants and money-lenders. England 
hereby represents the accession of business similar to that in Holland.
37
 The concept of 
‘gentlemanly capitalism’ can thus be seen as Cain and Hopkins’s take on the British 
developments in this regard, subsequently leading to its rise to hegemony in the nineteenth 
century. England is hereby special in the sense that it can also be considered the first 
industrial nation. The concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’ therefore directly challenges an 
industry-centric view of development, in which the Industrial Revolution represents a 
distinctive break, marking the beginning of (modern) capitalism.   
                                                 
30
 Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism. 1688-2000, p.57 
31
 Ibid. p.34 
32
 Ingham, Geoffrey British Capitalism: Empire, Merchants and Decline, p.341 
33
 Ibid. pp.341-2 
34
 Braudel, Fernand Afterthoughts on Material Civilization and Capitalism, p.67 
35
 Ibid. p.64 
36
 Ibid. p.68 
37
 Ibid. pp.64-5 
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Looking at its development from a historical perspective, the capitalist system has generally 
been described as a process from pre-industrial to proto-industrial, industrial and finally post-
industrial society.
38
 The focus on ‘industry’ is, of course, self-evident. Likewise, economists 
have traditionally agreed with such a progression, describing it through the transition in three 
stages: from primary (agriculture), to secondary (industry) to tertiary activity (services).
39
 A 
shift in academic analysis has identified the contribution of interrelated world regions in such 
a development from pre- to post-industrial society and aimed at incorporated wider world 
regions under the centre-periphery dichotomy. While traditional theories of macroeconomic 
thought emphasised a step by step scheme of development, this new school of historians have 
established its origin as Eurocentric, corresponding with developments in Europe, and have 
urged to incorporate the interdependence of different regions into the historical analysis.
40
 
The eurocentrism discourse, albeit important, is too far-flung to be discussed in detail here. It 
should be said however, that it proved to be extremely important in the past in order to 
provoke a certain degree of introspection within historiography, fuelling new research of the 
so-called ‘periphery’ and sometimes going as far as revising its perceived status as such.41 
Such research has not only integrated the wider world into the framework of development, but 
thus also acknowledges the role of Empire and imperialism within the economic development 
of different world regions throughout the centuries. Cain and Hopkins perspective stems from 
the centre but offers good reasoning for doing so. Trying to understand the causes rather than 
the consequences of imperialism, and identifying a central tendency within the British 
Empire, they argue that “the generic causes, in our view, have their origins at the centre”.42 At 
                                                 
38
 Cain and Hopkins write that nearly all historical discussion of capitalism has focused on the transition from 
pre-capitalist structures to industrial capitalism with an optional extension to post-industrial society. See Cain, 
P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism. 1688-2000, p.35 
39
 Ibid. p.35; the three-sector hypothesis was developed and utilised by such economists as the Australian Colin 
Clark, the French Jean Fourastié or the German Rolf Wagenführ and continuous to enjoys prominence today. For 
a brief introduction see for example Fourastié, Jean Die große Hoffnung des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts, pp.11-14 
40
 This concerns mainly a school of thought associated with Dependency theory and world systems analysis 
including such influential writers as Fernand Braudel, Immanuel Wallerstein and Eric Williams who claim that 
the development of capitalism was inherently a transnational progress. Developments at the centre necessitated 
the incorporation of new regions as periphery, leading to their under-development and thus creating a globally 
increasing divergence of wealth and living standards. See Vries, Peer The California School and beyond: how to 
study the Great Divergence?, p.3  
41
 A group of scholars under the banner of ‘the California School’, including for example Kenneth Pomeranz, R. 
Bin Wong and Andre Gruder Frank have aimed to rewrite the economic history of Asia (mainly China) and the 
‘West’ emphasising Eurasian similarities in economic development of the early modern period through the 
‘surprising resemblance thesis’. Frank argues that the China of the early modern period actually represented the 
centre of what can be seen as global trade and the economy of the time. For more information see Frank, André 
Gruder ReOrient. Global Economy in the Asian Age; for a summary on the California School see Vries, Peer The 
California School and beyond: how to study the Great Divergence? 
42
 Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism. 1688-2000, p.60 
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the same time they point out that drawing a line of causation from centre to periphery “[…] is 
not to be seen as the product of Euro-centric bias complemented by a dated disregard for the 
internal history of countries outside Europe.”43   
 
For Cain and Hopkins, imperialism in its crudest form is viewed as a type of expansion that 
involves some sort of intrusion into the sovereignty of another state and therefore that “[…] 
one power has the will, and, if it is to succeed, the capacity to shape the affairs of another by 
imposing upon it.”44 The academic debate surrounding imperialism has a long tradition but 
Webster points out that, with the exception of Marx, few of the earlier studies have survived 
intact into modern discussions providing viable explanations.
45
 The modern historical debate 
over imperialism has been shaped most prominently by Hobson, Lenin, Schumpeter as well as 
Robinson and Gallagher,
46
 and Cain and Hopkins themselves readily point out that they have 
been greatly influenced by those predecessors. While criticising serious analytical flaws in his 
analysis, they acknowledge their indebtedness to Lenin for putting British imperialism into a 
global context.
47
 They have been inspired by Hobson’s outline of finance as a driving force of 
the imperial engine, despite criticising his tendency to resort to conspiracy theories.
48
  
Schumpeter, who, on the other hand, argued that imperialism was driven by atavistic feudal 
notions of power and supremacy,
49
 is applauded for the observation that capitalism was under 
the social and political direction of older elites. And finally, Robinson and Gallagher, have, in 
Cain and Hopkins’s words “[…] set the agenda for the study of imperial history”50 by 
redefining the concept of imperialism to include the informal empire.
51
  
 
While debates over definitions of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ Empire exceed the scope of this 
paper, they do however serve as a reminder of the complexity of the concept of imperialism 
itself.
52
 Hyam goes as far as to discard ‘imperialism’ in its entirety as a ‘pseudo-concept’, 
                                                 
43
 Ibid. p.60 
44
 Ibid. p.54 
45
 Webster, Anthony Gentlemen Capitalists. British Imperialism in South East Asia 1170-1890, p.4   
46
 Ibid. p.4 
47
 Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism. 1688-2000, p.31 
48
 Ibid. p.33 
49
 Webster, Anthony Gentlemen Capitalists. British Imperialism in South East Asia 1170-1890, p.6 
50
 Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism. 1688-2000, p.26 
51
 Webster, Anthony Gentlemen Capitalists. British Imperialism in South East Asia 1170-1890, p.7  
52
 For Cain and Hopkins (pp.55-6) ‘informal imperialism’ constitutes an ‘attempt’ or an ongoing process of 
expanding economically and politically at the expense of a foreign country, which did produce a fully fledged 
British ‘informal Empire’. Davis (in Dumett, p.83) has however argued that such a definition is too broad and 
‘soft’, as it also accommodates unequal and disadvantageous relationships between countries in trade and 
investment and the exercise of undue influence through finance and diplomacy as well as through aggressive 
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which, due to its analytical looseness, takes on a life of its own, reducing real people and 
processes such as ‘industrialisation’ to the status of ‘agents’, while being adaptable in its 
meaning to suit the purposes of any given interpretation.
53
 While this evaluation may be kept 
in mind in order to remain critical of the concept, discarding ‘imperialism’ all together clearly 
is counterproductive. Magee and Thompson point out that “the British imperial economy is 
often cast in one of two starkly contrasting models: it is conceived either as a largely fictitious 
entity or as a very real one based on hegemonic power relations.”54 The first group 
emphasises free trade and a laissez-faire political economy, advocating little role to the 
government other than the provision of basic infrastructure, education and law and order, and 
thus minimizing the institutional role of the British Empire in 19
th
 century economic 
development. The second group on the other hand, places the role of Empire at the very heart 
of economic development.
55
 Vries argues that both such theoretical directions of thought are 
highly questionable. In this regard, the classic-liberal interpretation, which ultimately 
advocates the rise of the British Empire to the formation of a free market, is hardly justifiable 
today. Likewise, the neo-Marxist interpretations that link the rise of industry in Britain 
directly with the development of the British Empire have been severely questioned. Instead, 
he points to recent debates which emphasise a position that lies somewhere in the middle, 
whereby attention is given to the role of the military fiscal state and/or mercantilism.
56
 Cain 
and Hopkins’s account of British imperialism can be allocated along these lines of 
argumentation as they ascribe a great role to the policies of British military fiscal state. 
Urging to see imperialism as a process transmitting impulses from a particular source of 
                                                                                                                                                        
intervention in a foreign nation’s political affairs. He argues that it remains necessary to prove that some type of 
coercion and some type of exploitation are present, before one can speak of ‘imperialism’. Cain and Hopkins 
(pp.55-6) acknowledge that investment, commerce and migration in itself are not necessarily imperialistic, but 
they identify a tendency for expansionist impulses to become imperialist when coming up against societies 
which needed reforming and restructuring before expansionist ambitions could be realised or which seemed 
neither amicable to change or incapable of resisting it. Such problems of definition tie in with the highly 
controversial ‘imperialism of free trade’ debate, fuelled by the work of Robinson and Gallagher, which can be 
traced through discussions surrounding neo-classical and neo-liberal trade theories of modern economics well 
into the 20th century (Dumett, p.18). See Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism. 1688-2000, pp.55-6; 
Davis, Lance The late nineteenth-century British Imperialist: specification, quantification and controlled 
conjectures in Dumett, Raymond E. (ed.) Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism. The New Debate on 
Empire, p.83; Dumett, Raymond E. (ed.) Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Imperialism. The New Debate on 
Empire, p.18; Gallagher, John, Robinson, Ronald The Imperialism of Free Trade. 
53
 Hyam, Ronald Understanding the British Empire, p.136 
54
 Magee, Gary B., Thompson, Andrew S. Empire and Globalisation. Networks of People, Goods and Capital in 
the British World, c. 1850-1914, p.9  
55
 Ibid. p.10 
56
 Vries, Peer Zur politischen Ökonomie des Tees, p133 
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energy, they reinsert gentlemanly capitalism and the service sector industries through which it 
operates, as a key source.
57
        
 
Before going into further detail, the last concept of importance that remains to be defined thus 
represents the service sector. Again, this is not an easy task as Cain and Hopkins explain 
themselves that “no satisfactory definition of services has yet been devised”.58  Being viewed 
as a ‘junior partner’ and dependent of manufacturing during the classic phase of 
industrialisation, services only attract considerable interest during what has been labelled, 
albeit insufficiently defined, as post-industrialism.
59
 From economists such as Smith to 
Kaldor services are viewed as a derivate form, or even parasitic on, the anterior and superior 
process of producing goods.
60
 As has been explained, Cain and Hopkins main line of 
argumentation allocates an important role to the distribution and financing of manufactures, 
not just to their production. Since services such as transport, banking and insurance are all 
integral to production processes, they can be referred to as ‘producer’ or ‘intermediate’ 
services.
61
 Rabach explains that services hereby provide links between the segments of 
production, binding together spheres of production and circulation. Services therefore 
integrate and co-ordinate globalised production processes.
62
 What is needed however is a 
value-free definition, an endeavour which is further complicated by the vast amount of 
activities that characterise the service sector. Yet, a common feature constitutes that services 
do not represent stockable commodities. This definition includes a wide range of activities, 
notably in banking, insurance, communication, distribution, transport, public service and a 
multiplicity of personal services.
63
 Cain and Hopkins explain that generally speaking, they 
refer to the service sector with these occupations in mind. Before analysing the close relation 
of services and production in more detail, it is however necessary to explore the development 
of the British service sector and its resulting impact on imperial and foreign policy through 
Cain and Hopkins’s concept of gentlemanly capitalism. 
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II. 1. b. Landed Power and Monied Interest: the Revolutions 
 
Eric Hobsbawm famously called the period of 1789-1848 in Europe ‘the age of revolution’, as 
the world was transformed by the ‘dual revolution’, comprising the French Revolution and the 
British Industrial Revolution.
64
 In Britain, two preceding developments are among those 
carrying the label of ‘revolution’, having contributed greatly to the development of the British 
capitalist system. One of them is the Glorious Revolution of 1688, which led to a new 
settlement between crown and aristocracy, establishing the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty and representing a decisive shift of power in favour of the landed interest.
65
 
Shortly thereafter followed the Financial Revolution of the 1690s, which among other 
important financial innovations, centred on the foundation of the Bank of England and the 
creation of the national debt.
66
 An important consequence of the Financial Revolution was to 
create stable conditions for the integration and expansion of a national and imperial capital 
market centred on London, arguably fuelling through trade developments in Britain that 
would greatly contribute to the onset of the Industrial Revolution.
67
     
 
In 1688 the Catholic King James II was replaced by the protestant Dutchman William of 
Orange who was married to James II’s first daughter Mary, thus being able to claim the 
English throne. In retrospect the Dutch invasion was termed a ‘revolution’ because it led to a 
political settlement that fundamentally changed the relationship between Crown and 
Parliament.
68
 The Revolution of 1688 not only installed a new protestant monarch, but also a 
new type of monarchy which destroyed the financial independence of the crown. In order to 
secure an adequate income, the king was now compelled to govern through parliament which 
was in the control of the landed interest represented by aristocrats and gentry. Land was a 
permanent and prestigious form of wealth and therefore allowed time for the affairs of state.
69
 
Cain and Hopkins describe the landed interest as a socially exclusive group, maintained by in-
group marriage, demonstrating an ideological cohesion through their commitment to the 
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Church of England and shaping cultural homogeneity through public schools.
70
 While they 
have been criticized for exaggerating the coherence and self-containedness of this elite,
71
 Cain 
and Hopkins do acknowledge that sometimes powerful opposition existed. They argue 
however, that opposition remained within constitutional limits and, when necessary, was 
brought under control.
72
 According to them, the landed elite’s domination over parliament 
remained undisturbed before 1832 and was only slowly eroded thereafter, with such control 
also providing authority over the legal system, public expenditure and defence.
73
 The law thus 
was to act in order to defend property rights such as land,
74
 agricultural interests were to be 
protected, and taxation of land was to be kept at a minimum. O’Brien hereby explains that 
while taxes did go up, they fell relatively lightly upon the landowner’s wealth.75 Nonetheless, 
capital for defence needed to be raised since the perceived vulnerability of the new order and 
its supporters to foreign and domestic challenges necessitated a strong military arm of state.
76
 
In the words of Cain and Hopkins, alarms were many and real, including the French wars, the 
Jacobite threat at home and the Jacobine threat abroad, as well as global conflicts such as the 
Seven Years War.
77
 How did Britain not only overcome major wars and minor conflicts, but 
emerge to be the main hegemonic naval, commercial, imperial and industrial power by the 
time of the Vienna Congress in 1815,
78
 as well as avoid the destiny of revolution shared by so 
many European powers in 1848?  
 
Carruthers writes that in 1672 England was a weak nation-state and a second rate military 
power. In 1712, only forty years later, it had become one of the major military powers and 
had successfully checked French expansion in the War of Spanish Succession.
79
 As outlined, 
such successes clearly required the mobilisation of capital for military expenditures and a 
major problem therefore represented raising funds without inflicting excessive direct tax 
burdens on the general population and the landed elite, which might have precipitated 
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domestic revolt.
80
 The answer, in its simplest form, was to borrow money. O’Brien explains 
that “between 1693 and 1713, ministers experimented with methods and instruments for 
borrowing long and medium term, developed elsewhere in Europe, particularly in the 
Netherlands, which included tontines, annuities for lives and shorter periods, and loans linked 
to lotteries.”81 The bulk of the resulting financial innovations can be summarised under the 
term ‘Financial Revolution’. At the revolution’s heart thus lay the creation of the national 
debt in order to finance military endeavours. This resulted in the formation of the Bank of 
England which assumed the responsibility of managing such government debt.
82
 Webster 
agrees when he summarises that the Bank of England was specifically created in order to fund 
the national debt which in turn had been incurred largely to sustain national military 
strength.
83
 When the first of seven major conflicts with France and her allies came to an end, 
a national debt, a government bank, and procedures for negotiating the flotation of long-term 
loans on the London capital market were in place.
84
  
 
In order to describe such a predominance of military concerns in state policy formation and 
financial priorities, the term ‘military fiscalism’ has been used.85 While representing a 
complex system including credit and taxation, the most obvious and important aspect of 
military fiscalism is the joining of public expenditure and war. Cain and Hopkins provide 
impressive numbers illustrating the increase of expenditure during the major wars of the 
eighteenth century: in 1700 the national debt stood at 14 million pounds; in 1748 it was 78 
million pounds; by 1763 it had jumped to 133 million pounds; by 1783 it had grown to 245 
million pounds; and in 1815 in reached 700 million pounds.
86
 O’Brien adds that by the 1820s 
the nominal capital of the state’s funded debt amounted to more than twice the national 
income: “[…] a ratio remarkable for the period and astonishing even by the standards of 
profligate borrowing displayed by many governments of the late twentieth century.”87 As a 
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result, Cain and Hopkins observe that interest payments on the national debt swallowed more 
than 50 per cent of public expenditure in peace time.
88
 Mathias calculations suggest that 
interest payments alone were equivalent to about half the value of total exports in the 
eighteenth century.
89
 Servicing such a huge amount of national debt indicates that the real 
burden of taxation was heavier in England than in France, both on a per capita basis and as a 
share of national income, and that it further increased as the century advanced.
90
 Kindleberger 
states however that: “a comparison of British and French history in money and banking 
indicates that Britain was a century ahead of France in evolving most of its financial 
institutions.”91 Cain and Hopkins agree that the form taken by the public debt and its 
management were far more advanced in Britain, providing investors with confidence that 
their money would be returned and thus allowing Britain to borrow extensively and 
effectively in times of war, while France was forced to rely much more heavily on taxation.
92
 
An indirect regressive system of taxation led the bulk of the British tax burden to be borne by 
the mass of consumers, principally in the form of exercise and custom duties. The land tax on 
the other hand supplied a small and diminishing proportion of the total.
93
  
 
While superior credit facilities developed through the Financial Revolution helped to make 
Britain an international power, an indirect regressive taxation system thus served the landed 
interests, chief beneficiaries of the settlement of the Glorious Revolution.
94
 In regard to 
British development it is of course also necessary to point to other important factors in trade 
and production which fuelled economic growth. The impact of the Industrial Revolution was 
with no doubt highly influential, leading to a reorganisation of production and a 
diversification of consumption, and helping to bring both, an increased volume and a greater 
variety of goods and services, into the net purposes of taxation.
95
 However, as already 
discussed, recently revised conjectures about the numbers suggest that the British economy 
grew more slowly and steadily through time than traditional accounts of the Industrial 
Revolution have indicated. O’Brien argues that the tax revenues between 1688 and 1815 
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increased much more rapidly than the economy at large, with taxes fluctuating, rising in 
wartimes and falling back when hostilities ceased. Economic growth, fuelled through the 
Industrial Revolution, certainly contributed in making excessive war taxation more tolerable. 
Yet, the impressive British fiscal successes of the Hanoverian regime of the 18
th 
and 19
th
 
century, owed as much to the supportive public consensus over the broad objectives of 
external policy as to the opportunities created by developments in the economy.
96
  
 
This raises the question of how Britain managed to establish such a public consensus over 
external policy, resulting in a huge increase of national debt. Voices of opposition did, of 
course, exist. Alarm over the novelty and size of the national debt already emerged during the 
brief interlude of peace from 1698 to 1702, and politicians, investors and taxpayers did 
become vocally concerned about the scale of accumulated debt and the burden of taxes 
required for its service in the aftermath of every war. Yet, crisis of confidence were avoided 
as negotiations for loans were conducted with growing expertise.
97
 O’Brien points out that: 
“[…] ministers managed to assuage radical predictions of national bankruptcy and to allay the 
political envy aroused by a supposed stranglehold on power, exerted by a parvenu, ‘monied 
interest’ of dubious birth and probity.”98 The ‘monied interest’ hereby represents the lenders 
behind the national debt. As creditors to this system, which was taking on increasingly 
complex financial innovations, they had an inherit interest in its success. Carruthers reminds 
us that while debtors depended on creditors for money, after the loan is made, creditors are in 
a sense beholden to their debtors. Their interests become aligned because the creditor now has 
a stake in the debtor’s ability to repay.99 When the debtor is a sovereign, lending money takes 
on an inevitably political complexion, with the political character of sovereign debtor-creditor 
relationships shifting to an even further level when the sovereign’s debts become 
commodities that traders buy and sell.
100
 On the one hand the post-Glorious Revolution 
regime acquired many allies by borrowing so heavily; on the other hand government debt 
became a highly liquid financial commodity, easily traded on an active stock market. Crown 
creditors could buy and sell their government’s debts by trading in for example joint-stock 
company shares such as the East India Company which loaned large sums of money to the 
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British government.
101
 Herein lies the essential question of who was it that provided the 
money that made up the government debt and financed the British military fiscal state which 
became a global power and acquired a vast Empire?  
 
The aristocracy and gentry in possession of landed wealth clearly formed the elite of the 
British system and remained the dominant force in Britain until the late nineteenth century. 
Cain and Hopkins remind their readers that initially the most important form of capitalist 
wealth in Britain was the rentier capitalism, which arose from the ownership of land by a 
numerically small elite.
102
 Two other social groups had started to make their impact felt 
however, as they established themselves around the time of the Glorious Revolution, 
contributing greatly to the interrelated developments of the British system. One such group 
concerns manufacturers, which due to the defiant changes brought to production by the 
Industrial Revolution, have been well studied. Cain and Hopkins write that “manufacturers 
were already important and familiar figures on the landscape on 1688, and their role expanded 
thereafter, as is well known.”103 Yet, it should be kept in mind that the greater part of 
manufacturing output still came from small scale, traditional (often household) unit of 
production, once again underlining that industrialisation was a longer process than traditional 
historiography has often suggested. Only in the 1820s did investment in industry become 
significantly larger than in agriculture. The woollen industry nevertheless made a sizeable 
contribution to domestic employment as well as providing export earnings and state revenues 
in the 18
th
 century. In the 19
th
 century, the cotton industry preformed a similar function on an 
even larger scale.
104
 The opportunities of employment for the landless in industry, also made 
it possible for landowners to reorganise their estates into larger, less labour intensive farms, 
enclose commons, and evict cottars and squatters, without facing increased threats to the 
security of their assets and property rights from crime, political expropriation, disorder, and 
even rates levied to relieve poverty.
105
 Agriculture in turn became more market orientated and 
supportive for an industrialising, urbanising, and trading economy, feeding workers and 
families at prices that left them with enough purchasing power to spend on manufactured 
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goods and imports. At the same time, manufacturers and their workers produced the goods 
that gave Britain a competitive advantage and fuelled its trade and commerce.
106
  
 
The organisation and financing of such trade and commerce constitutes the other group, 
which can be summarised in characterising Britain’s service sector. O’Brien writes that: 
 
The finance and professional skill required to engage in servicing the international economy had been 
accumulating among communities of merchants in London, Bristol and other port cities along the west coast 
well before 1688. By the time of the glorious revolution, London’s merchants, shippers, warehousemen, and 
financiers more or less ran Britain’s transcontinental trade.107 
 
With a focus on industrial development, historiography has produced what Chapman calls a 
distorted economic history, substantially neglecting the role of trade and finance which was 
centred in the City of London, occupying the top of the national league of wealth.
108
 This is 
illustrated by Lee’s calculations on British regional revenue returns in the nineteenth century: 
he argues that the relative affluence of the South East, traditionally home to British finance 
and commerce, is hereby unquestioned in both per capita terms or as a proportion of the 
national average.
109
 Rubenstein points out that: “the majority of non-landed wealth owners 
were men employed in finance and commerce.”110 His analysis of millionaires and half-
millionaires in Britain shows that more fortunes were made in commerce and finance than in 
the manufacturing industry.
111
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Cain and Hopkins also highlight that the fortunes accumulated by industrialists did not 
compare with those derived from land and from the financial and service sector. They thus 
emphasise the importance of this third group, which accumulated a large amount of wealth 
through trade and finance. This is further underlined by the fact that manufacturers relied 
increasingly on the worldwide system of distribution organised and financed from London.
114
  
O’Brien agrees when he underlines that “[…] the role of merchants in organising, co-
ordinating, and sustaining commerce between the metropolitan centre and the ports, town, 
naval bases, forts, settlements, mines, plantations, farms and fisheries of a far-flung Empire 
and Britain’s networks for international trade can hardly be overstated.”115  
 
To define a ‘merchant’ is not easy, since this could describe almost anyone who buys and 
sells goods.
116
 Braudel makes a distinction between tradesmen or dealers and merchants, 
based in English ports and engaged in the long distance trade. The merchant hereby clearly 
stands out from the mass of ordinary dealers, representing the top of the commercial hierarchy 
as he handles the big international transactions of the day, which in turn require a large pool 
of capital.
117
  Likewise, the merchant’s enterprises pose problems of definition, as they often 
engaged in a wide range of financial and transportation services. Geoffrey points out that 
“[…] it can be purely arbitrary if a firm is classified as a trading company or something else, 
such as a merchant bank or a shipping company.”118 While shops and peddlers increasingly 
specialized, the top-level merchant, at least until the nineteenth century, virtually never 
restricted himself to exclusively handling a single product, or even to a single activity, as he 
could as well become a ship chandler, an underwriter, a lender, a borrower, a financier, a 
banker or an agricultural manager.
119
 Due to the conjectural attributes of capitalism, flexibility 
to shift from one sector to another could substantially enhance profits.
120
 In some cases, 
money trading represented an exception and, as their roles advanced, merchants specialised in 
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financing or insuring trade and loans rather than trading on their own account.
121
 Braudel does 
however not attribute long-lasting success to this type of specialisation until the period of 
1830-60: “[…] when banks grabbed up everything, both industry and merchandise, and when 
the economy in general was strong enough to support this edifice permanently.”122 
 
It has become clear that large amounts of capital were required to engage in what can be 
summarised under the banner of ‘production’ services and that the mercantile elite, along with 
the landed aristocracy, represented the top-wealth of the country.
123
 Herein lay the deal which 
had at its heart the creation of the military fiscal state financed through the national debt and 
successfully waging war in Europe and abroad, acquiring a vast Empire and continuing to 
exist through centuries, leaving the loss of mainland colonies to the side, negotiating the 
transition to free trade and avoiding revolution in 1848.
124
 This is not to simplify the many 
interrelated developments contributing for example to victory or defeat of war, but it serves to 
outline a systemic development that was to characterise the British military fiscal state: the 
creation of what Cain and Hopkins termed ‘gentlemanly capitalism’. The deal in its simplest 
form comprises a trade-off between the capital of the service sector and the political power of 
the aristocracy. Webster explains that: “London’s merchants and bankers enthusiastically 
availed themselves of the profitable opportunities in lending to government, confident in the 
state’s commitment of tax revenues to servicing the national debt.”125 This led to an 
increasing dependency: through the national debt, mercantile elite’s financial interests thus 
were joined to that of the post-1688 regime.
126
 The result was not only a financial 
collaboration that fuelled the political power of the mercantile elites, but also their integration 
into the ranks of gentility, further merging the two social elites into a somewhat coherent 
group of what Cain and Hopkins called ‘gentlemanly capitalists’. Those who made their 
fortune in manufacturing however, were hereby largely excluded and are instead represented 
through what can be labelled ‘industrial capitalism’.   
 
The social concept of gentility was old in origin: the idea of the gentleman is feudal in its 
inspiration and deeply rooted in the British system, albeit evidently changing and shifting 
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through time. Such an evolution of the notion of gentility makes it difficult to pin-point its 
exact meaning but its main social qualities remained stable through time and can be used as a 
reverence point.
127
 Cain and Hopkins summarise these through a code of honour which placed 
duty before self-advancement while acting on Christian rules of conduct. The acquirement of 
highly held social and religious values required young gentlemen to pass through a long 
process of education and thus presupposed the possession of substantial wealth.
 128
 Clark 
points out that the elite schools such as Eton and Westminster were playing a distinct social 
role in preparing their pupils to take their place within an aristocratic world of values: 
“nowhere else in Europe was school education so important to the structure of the elite’s 
code.”129  More so, the gentlemanly lifestyle required sufficient time to practice the 
gentlemanly arts, also obtained through this distinguished education. While income was 
needed, working directly for money was associated with dependence and cultural 
inferiority.
130
 Such a perspective explains that the world of production was held in low repute 
and a wide distance was sought from the mundane world of producing commodities, while 
aiming for the higher calling of directing others.
131
 Viewed from such an angle, traditional 
accounts of what constitutes the cultural development of capitalism, often associated with 
protestant work ethics in a Weberian sense, seem to stand in contrast with the gentlemanly 
values and lifestyle.
132
 Cain and Hopkins themselves mention that while Weber recognises the 
generally higher status accorded to propertied wealth and the greater power and authority 
which it commanded, his categories need modifying to allow for the fact that some forms of 
‘entrepreneurial wealth’ were closer to the gentlemanly ideal than others. The service sector 
and its relative distance from the actual process of production, thus presents itself more 
naturally as a gentlemanly occupation than manufacturing.
133
 The concept of gentlemanly 
capitalism allowed the gentlemanly values, and with it the old aristocratic system of the 
landed elite, to leave feudal structures behind and live on through occupations in the service 
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sector.
134
 Their indirect relationship to the productive forces, and therefore also to an 
increasingly class conscious workforce, allowed gentlemanly capitalists to present themselves 
more easily as natural leaders.
135
 Adam Smith description of the nobleman’s natural ability to 
lead is hereby exemplary: 
His air, his manner, his deportment, all mark that elegant and graceful sense of his won superiority, which those 
who are born to inferior status can hardly arrive at: these are the arts by which he proposes to make mankind 
more easily submit to his authority, and to govern their inclinations according to his own pleasure: and this he is 
seldom disappointed. These arts, supported by rank and preheminence, are, upon ordinary occasions, sufficient 
to govern the world.
136
 
 
 
The nineteenth century gentleman therefore constitutes a compromise between the needs of 
the landed interests, whose power was in decline, and the aspirations of an expanding service 
sector.
137
 The incorporation of the mercantile elites not only represents the need of serving the 
national debt, but also allowed the aristocracy to retain and further establish their place within 
the development of the capitalist system which is often misleadingly characterised entirely by 
processes of industrialisation. The development of gentlemanly capitalism was, of course, a 
slow and gradual process.
138
 Nevertheless, Cain and Hopkins observe that by the 1850s a 
clear distinction could be drawn between gentlemanly and industrial capital. The former 
hereby not only set the cultural tone, but was closer to the centre of power and represented the 
dominant influence upon the expression of that power overseas.
139
 Black agrees when he 
states that: “in practice, important mercantile interests generally enjoyed easy access to 
ministers and officials, and this was assumed to be necessary and normal.”140 Through time, 
inter-marriage, the acquisition of titles and the purchase of land, greatly contributed to the 
mergence of the landed and the monied elites. By the second half of the 18
th
 century the 
younger sons of landed families, aided through the patronage system, increasingly found 
employment in the service sector. It became acceptable for younger sons of aristocrats to take 
posts in the colonies, including placements arranged by the East India Company, or to take on 
apprenticeships at leading merchant houses.
141
 At the same time, the growth of the mortgage 
market further fuelled the growing interconnection of landed and monied elites, as mortgages 
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became the recognised means of obtaining credit on the security of land.
142
 All these 
developments highlight that the fortunes of the magnates who made the revolution of 1688 
and those of the merchant bankers who underwrote it, became increasingly entwined both in 
regard to the national interest and in matters of personal finance.
143
 By the close of the 18
th
 
century, the monied interest was accepted into the ranks of gentlemen and in Cain and 
Hopkins words: “Bankers became gentlemen not least because gentlemen needed bankers.”144  
 
II. 1. c. Landed Power and Monied Interest: the Empire 
 
Cain and Hopkins link the developments in Britain to the expansion of the British Empire, 
whereby gentlemanly capitalism essentially constitutes the driving force or the ‘impulse’ of 
British imperialism.
145
 ‘Gentlemanly capitalists’ were mainly based in the City of London 
which had emerged as the financial and commercial hub of the system. From London, trade 
and finance was organised and the geographical as well as social proximity to the political 
power of the metropolis further fuelled the establishment of the City as a main port from 
which the imperial system was managed and exported.
146
 The influence of the City and the 
forces thrown up by the financial revolutions gave great impetus to overseas trade through 
improved credit facilities, through the expansion of the mercantile marine, powerfully 
supported by the Navigation Acts, and through advanced forms of commercial capitalism, 
such as the East India Company with its close links to Westminster and its predominantly 
City based investors.
147
 Webster summarises that overseas possessions such as in the 
Americas or India were important sources of profit for London financiers, thus helping to 
secure funding of the national debt. This view describes the roots of a self-perpetuating 
system of military fiscalism exported abroad: the defence of Empire required military strength 
in the colonies, which in turn necessitated high revenues to meet defence costs.
148
  
 
Trade provided the profits for the financiers of the national debt, the British Empire in turn 
allowed for such trade to be conducted on favourable conditions. While manufacturers needed 
a vent for their surplus products, merchants profited from handling their goods and dealing 
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with the re-export trades. The home government indirectly gained from enlarged custom 
duties, the landed could therefore enjoy favourable tax treatment, and finally, the investors of 
the national debt returns increased when borrowing and interest rates rose.
149
 Trade increased 
nearly six times during the course of the eighteenth century, but it also took a somewhat 
change of direction.
150
 Cain and Hopkins show that, while in 1700-1 Britain traded 82 per 
cent of its home-produced exports with continental Europe, this share fell to 40 per cent in 
1772-3. Imports from Europe declined from 68 per cent of the total, to 47 per cent during the 
same period. This fundamental re-orientation of British commerce is further underlined when 
looking at Europe’s share of Britain’s total overseas trade, dropping from 74 per cent in 1723-
27 to 33 per cent in 1803-7.
151
 In comparison, Morgan also identifies a market shift by 
looking at the transatlantic sector. His numbers show that at the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, Europe still dominated British overseas trade: in 1700-1, the colonies of the New 
World accounted 11 per cent of the value of British exports and for 20 per cent of imports. By 
1797-8, North America and the West Indies received 57 per cent of British export and 
supplied 32 per cent of imports.
152
 An important aspect of the development of British and 
European trade was, of course, provided by the Empire and European imperial aspirations and 
rivalries. Morgan explains that by 1776, Britain’s Atlantic Empire consisted of thirteen 
colonies in North America, the Canadian maritime provinces of Newfoundland, Quebec, 
Labrador and Nova Scotia, the Hudson Bay’s territory and a cluster of Caribbean islands. 
Additionally, there was substantial English trade with Asia via the East India Company, 
followed by territorial expansion in India, mainly in Bengal, as well as English voyages to the 
Pacific, leading to white settlement in Australia in 1788.
153
 Before analysing the British 
Empire in more detail however, it is important to understand the reasons for its specific 
outline. Examining Britain’s reorientation of trade in the eighteenth century will hereby 
provide insights into the development of British imperial policy.  
 
In order to explain the intertwined developments leading to such a reorientation of trade, 
geopolitical as well as economic reasoning should be considered. Britain’s geographical and 
political position within a European context shows that the inability to control European 
continental trade, as well as the threat by the emergence of any large single power there, led to 
                                                 
149
 Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism. 1688-2000, p.88 
150
 Chapman, Stanley Merchant Enterprise in Britain. From the Industrial Revolution to World War I, p.22 
151
 Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism. 1688-2000, p.90 
152
 Morgan, Kenneth Slavery, Atlantic Trade and the British Economy, 1600-1800, p.18 
153
 Ibid., p.6 
  
- 29 - 
 
a concentration overseas. Cain and Hopkins explain that by the middle of the eighteenth 
century, Britain had therefore capitalised on its geographical location by building up a naval 
power. They describe that a strong command of the sea was meant to prevent France from 
blocking Britain’s trade with the continent and frustrate any attempt of invasion. While 
Britain continued to seek allies in Europe, especially among the smaller states that were 
conscious of their vulnerability in regard to their larger neighbours, its advantages lay in its 
long-serving blue water policy and overseas.
154
 Harley agrees that “in the eighteenth century 
imperial wars, Britain adopted a ‘blue water strategy’ that exploited its island position. The 
navy protected the British Isles from invasion and harassed French trade, while the British 
subsidised continental allies to fight land campaigns against France.”155 Britain maintained a 
wartime fleet of between 185 and 350 vessels in the first half of the eighteenth century and 
could establish supremacy over the combined fleets of France and Spain.
156
 However, the 
‘blue water strategy' was expensive: fleets required greater and more sustained outlays than 
armies and subsidies to continental allies required large amounts of cash at short notice.
157
 
While Britain’s island position therefore turned a great part of its attention away from Europe 
and towards other parts of the world, again, it was also the country’s superior ability to 
borrow and tax that provided it with an advantage over its rivals. It thus becomes clear that 
the re-orientation of trade and the resulting blue water strategy plays a significant role in the 
development of gentlemanly capitalism: its consequence was to elevate the standing of those 
who supported it, so that in time they became defenders of the national interest and not 
merely advocates of sectional advantage in regard to for example favourable trading 
conditions.
158
  
 
When looking at what can be labelled economic explanations of Britain’s re-orientation of 
commerce, an important factor is that Britain faced difficulties to increase sales of British 
manufactures (mainly woollens) in Europe which resulted in a search for new markets.
159
 
Sollow explains that: “By the eighteenth century France, Germany, and Austria began to 
supply their own woollen textiles needs, and traditional British export markets faltered.”160 In 
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an era in which competition drove their products from Europe, the markets of the new world 
kept British woolworkers employed.
161
 Additionally, Britain saw an import-led increase in 
demand for new colonial products such as sugar, tea and tobacco, which was further driven by 
the rise of incomes in London and south-east England, derived from wealth generated from 
farming, finance and services.
162
 While import consisted heavily of tropical primary staple 
products, they were paid for by exports of manufactured goods and the earnings from 
shipping and other international services.
163
 According to Cain and Hopkins: “the import bill 
was met partly by pushing manufactures into new corners of the world, and partly by 
capturing the re-export trade, that is by selling colonial products in continental Europe.”164 
Re-exports represented an important source of income as they accounted to one-third of the 
value of all exports during the first three quarters of the eighteenth century.
165
 New markets 
for manufactures, an increase of demand for colonial products and the re-export trade thus 
gave Britain a central position in a multilateral trading system developing in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth century, underlining the British role in the transaction sector. Yet, Chapman 
reminds us that: “the British Empire was not built up simply […] as the opportunity for off-
loading surplus manufactures; it is to be seen rather as a long term and continuous aspect of 
the strategy of British mercantile capitalism.”166    
 
Trade developed in the context of mercantilist regulations of the British Empire and while 
economic and geographic realities play an important role in its ascent to hegemony, it would 
simplify matters to depict its development as something comparable to an accident resulting 
out of such conditions. This ties in with debates over how much economic development owes 
to lucky geographical endowment or to a specific institutional set up. There is a long and 
distinguished line of theorizing that emphasises the role of geography - and therefore climate, 
endowment of natural resources, disease burden, transport costs, and diffusion of knowledge 
and technology from more advanced areas - when analysing the difference of economic 
growth rates world-wide.
167
 The view that climate has a direct effect on income through its 
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influence on work effort, dates back to Machiavelli (1519) and Montesquieu (1748) but recent 
works in this traditions include those by Jared Diamond and Jeffrey Sachs.
168
 Explanations 
that centre on the role institution for economic development on the other hand, stress the 
importance of property rights and the rule of law: “In this view, what matters are the rules of 
the game in a society and their conduciveness to desirable economic behaviour.”169 Most 
notably, North examined the contribution of institutional developments to economic growth 
throughout history, outlining that the design of state and formalized property rights played an 
important role in shaping economic change.
170
 The dispute about geography versus 
institutions however, is not so much about whether geography affects economic development, 
but more so, whether it effects economic development through the formation of institutions or 
via other channels.
171
  
 
Rodrik et al. state the obvious: long-term economic development is a complex phenomenon 
and the idea that any single determinant can provide an adequate explanation of centuries of 
economic history therefore seems almost absurd. Historians and many social scientists prefer 
more balanced explanations where geographic and institutional factors interact with human 
choices and many other not-so-simple twists and turns of fate.
172
 In regard to the development 
of the British Empire, O’Brien’s hereby provides a good summary: “Favourable natural 
endowments, proto-industrialisation, an enterprising community of merchants, and the 
construction of responsive financial institutions enabled the expansion of trade and Empire to 
take place.”173 More so, in the context of analysing the concept of gentlemanly capitalism, a 
substantial degree of emphasis simply has to be put on the importance of agency. This does 
not mean to discredit and/or ignore the contributions of conditions that lie outside the 
possibility of human influence, such as for example Britain’s island position, which impact 
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economic development. Yet, main focus lies in analysing imperial policy through individual 
agency, which fuelled the British trading system. Magee and Thompson are of the opinion 
that economic systems do not arise by accidents but that “their creation, evolution and 
maintenance are contingent upon an array of government and individual actions.”174 Cain and 
Hopkins underline that imperialism is to be seen as an act of will, therefore emphasising the 
conscious intensions of the actors concerned in order to make appropriate allowance for the 
role of individual agency in imperialism.
175
 Their approach also lends little support to the 
view that events and episodes normally included in the history of imperialism can be 
described solemnly as random incidences: while accidents happen, their occurrence in clusters 
or on a global scale indicates the possibility of underlying causes, which in themselves are not 
accidental.
176
 This brings us back to their argument that imperialism is to be seen as a process 
transmitting impulses from a particular source of energy, which in turn is described by Cain 
and Hopkins through the concept of gentlemanly capitalism.
177
 Having established the 
importance of the role of agency into the history of imperialism, it is now time to look at how 
such as a system was to be enforced and thus successfully established an Empire that was to 
resume a hegemonic position in world trade. Individual agency within the British Empire will 
be discussed through the intertwined relations of governmental policies, trading practices and 
social relations within the British Empire.  
 
From a governmental perspective, the fear of instability after the revolution in 1688 brought 
about centralising tendencies leading to the incorporation of Scotland by the Act of Union in 
1707, marked by the process of creating a protestant community.
178
 The already incorporated 
Welsh were subject to renewed anglicising influences and Ireland was placed under the 
management of Anglo-Irish protestant gentry.
179
 Abroad, the mainland colonies were put 
under firmer direction of the board of trade.
180
 In order to create artificial ties between the 
colonies and Britain, the Navigation Acts, which were powerfully supported by the mercantile 
marine, represent an important part of British imperial policy that connected the mother 
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country to its colonies.
181
 The five acts passed between 1651 and 1696 provided a large 
protected market for British manufactures within the Empire, confining oceanic trade with the 
mother county mainly to British owned vessels and by prohibiting the manufacture of various 
products in the colonies.
182
 Additionally, all colonial and European commodities had to be 
shipped to Britain or a British colony with an exception for certain enumerated commodities, 
including rice, tobacco, sugar, indigo and naval stores, which could be exported outside the 
British Empire after first being landed at a British port.
183
 The Navigation Acts thus 
stimulated various re-export trades and encouraged Britain to become an entrepôt for 
importing colonial staples.
184
 Harley points out that British ship owners and merchants 
expanded under the shelter they provided from competition.
185
 These systems of 
protectionism involved placing tariffs on foreign produced wares, on the one hand providing 
income for the British military fiscal state, and on the other hand protecting the interests of 
traders and merchants within the British Empire.
186
  
 
The Navigation Acts were not only essential for the development of British economic power, 
they also represent an example par excellence for the forces behind the British military fiscal 
state. While the navy was to protect their enforcement, the profiteers are among the 
commercial community of London, which handled import and exports as well as re-export 
trades. They are in turn among those investing in the national debt, which was created in order 
to fund military endeavours such as the navy and protect the interest of the landed elites from 
various threats at home and abroad.
187
 Additionally, the great economic interest of the 
aristocratic classes, namely agriculture, was tended to through the Corn Laws, which provided 
aid through export bounties at times of low domestic price and duties that protected from 
cheap imports of agricultural products.
188
 Policies such as the Navigation acts and the Corn 
laws, which lasted until the mid-nineteenth century,
189
 thus describe a governmental policy 
that was to protect the interests of merchants and aristocracy alike and show that their shared 
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interests weren’t confined to the boundaries of the state but more so extended to British 
foreign policy and fuelled the creation of the British Empire. 
 
While favourable laws provided the possibility and more so the profitability of trade within 
the Empire, it is now time to investigate the various forms in which such trade was to be 
conducted. This in turn leads back to the innovations of the financial revolution, often adopted 
from the Dutch, which fuelled long-distance trade and thus boosted the British service sector. 
Cain and Hopkins remind us that:  
The early eighteenth century saw the expansion of the East India Company and the South Sea Company, the two 
great companies which shares formed a sizeable part of the stock market, the growth of Lloyds as the 
international centre for underwriting, and the formation of new insurance companies, such as the Sun Fire Office 
(1708) and the Exchange Assurance Company (1720).
190
 
 
As a consequence, improvements of credit and commercial services boosted the shipping 
industry and promoted overseas trade.
191
 Geoffrey explains that merchant enterprise, trading 
goods and services between communities, extends back thousands of years and is thus the 
oldest form of international business. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth century however, 
large integrated firms known as ‘chartered trading companies’ such as the British and the 
Dutch East India Company or the Hudson’s Bay Company, which have sometimes been 
regarded as the first ‘modern’ multinationals, traded between Europe and the rest of the 
world.
192
 The Dutch East India Company had innovated its business structure already in 1612, 
shifting its organisation from adventures in individual voyages to a company with permanent 
capital that was not redistributed to investors at the end of each voyage. The British closely 
followed such innovations in order to obtain the ability to mobilise large capital for long 
distance trade.
193
 As a joint-stock company the East India Company thus represented the 
emergence of that category of business organisation in which capital was partially separated 
from its ownership; the need to arrange decisions and operating procedures, outlining the 
relations between the company’s entrepreneurial groups and the investing public, meant that 
its corporate activities were strongly linked to the British national economic life, and to that of 
the City in particular, through the capital market.
194
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While the Dutch company controlled Java and the Spice islands, the British East India 
Company had to relocate to India, where it flourished on the basis of military strength and a 
trading monopoly provided by the British government.
195
 Such a monopoly essentially meant 
that for more than a century the state effectively vested a group of merchants with semi-
sovereign rights abroad.
196
 These enormous concessions indicate that the development of the 
British East India Company is somewhat exemplary for the growing integration of 
commercial interest and state policy, as well as the continuous need of servicing the national 
debt. Until the mid-eighteenth century Britain’s interests in India, represented by the East 
India Company, were almost exclusively commercial.
197
 However, the Company ran into 
difficulties in the 1720s fuelled by the break up of the Mughal Empire and the threat of 
French competition.
198
 The search for new revenues and the continuous aim to improve 
profitability led to an attempt to restructure trade relations, resulting in two important military 
initiatives in the second part of the eighteenth century: the capture of the city of Surat, which 
gave Britain a commanding position over the West coast, and the conquest of the region of 
Bengal.
199
 Thereafter the quest for revenues to pay for military costs became a permanent one 
and thus distorted the East India Company’s commercial operations.200 With growing debts in 
the 1770, the government was drawn into the task of controlling the organisation and, as a 
result, of managing India too.
201
 The search for new revenue and the extension of financial 
credit also fuelled the expansion into the New World. The main difference hereby was that in 
North America the British were facing the challenge of young states that were being build up, 
while in India they ran into ancient Empires that were breaking down.
202
 The imperial 
administrations in both, India and the Americas, reflected the military fiscalism of the 
metropolitan regime: like Britain itself, many colonies were governed militaristic 
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administrations represented by the landed elite and working closely with local British 
commercial interests.
203
 Webster summarises that: “Defence of Empire required military 
strength in the colonies, which in turn necessitated high revenues to meet military costs.”204 
 
Finally, it is time to once more scrutinize the agents involved, this time looking at their 
attitudes and attributes in regard to Empire. This also requires an understanding of the 
thinking patterns of the past. Cain and Hopkins describe that the agents of imperialism, 
namely gentlemanly capitalists, “[…] normally believe that they represent a superior power, 
ideologically as well as materially, and their actions are driven on by a sense of mission 
which embraces, legitimizes and uplifts their private ambitions.”205 On the one hand, the 
political principals of the British system were exported abroad in the form of for example 
property rights, individualism, free markets and sound money. On the other hand, Britain’s 
representatives abroad shared the values and social origins of their counterparts in the 
metropole.
206
 Magee and Thompson explain that British migrants abroad not only reaffirmed, 
but often thought to improve upon the communities they left behind and that the notion of 
‘Britishness’ could be a powerful motivating ideology capable, with racially defined limits, of 
joining people together across the Empire. Cultural practices, such as for example the 
importation of British games and entertainments, sought to foster a continuing sense of 
attachment to Britain.
207
 Supported by missionaries, gentlemen abroad transmitted the 
Anglican version of the Christian message, closely entwined with economic orthodoxy, and 
implemented what Cain and Hopkins provokingly call ‘the world’s first comprehensive 
development programme’.208  
 
In extending the ideology of mission, the project of imperialism was rendered patriotic and 
thus had an effect on the British national identity itself.
209
 O’Brien writes that over the long 
eighteenth century the national identity of Britons was gradually reordered to sustain a 
stronger imperialistic impulse, which made it easier to mobilize the forces of the Crown and 
to appropriate the money required in order to confront Britain’s rivals for trade and Empire.210 
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Imperialism thus became an integral part of the configuration and expression of British 
society and played a vital role in maintaining privilege and property at home in an age of 
social upheaval.
211
 The gentlemanly elites, for whom the Empire provided substantial income 
flows, hereby represent the driving force behind imperialist enterprise.
212
 According to Cain 
and Hopkins, it is no coincidence that the most persuasive images of imperialism were those 
which projected gentility rather than industry and did not embrace the industrial centres of 
Birmingham or Manchester.
213
 While industrialists were engaging in the class struggle at 
home, the representatives of the service sector were what Cain and Hopkins call the 
‘advanced guards of capitalism abroad’.214 On the one hand they shared the values and 
language of the political elite, on the other hand they came in contact with potential clients, 
customers and producers abroad and thus created a network on which producers in Britain 
heavily relied on.
215
  
 
It has been outlined that the industrial interests were not incorporated into the alliance 
between finance and land with manufacturers remaining political ‘outsiders’ in the 
determination of policy.
216
 Yet, during the second half of the eighteenth century, the 
economic and political arrangements which had followed the 1688 settlement, was running 
into difficulties: rivalries with other colonial powers such as the French and the Dutch were 
starting to take its toll and while Britain emerged as a winner out of the Seven Years War, 
high military costs resulted in increased tax burden not only in Britain but throughout the 
Empire.
217
 The coming of peace in 1763 led to a British determination of strengthening its 
grasp on the mainland colonies, resulting in tightened mercantilist regulations in order to 
increase revenues and limit the independent economic development of the colonies. Such 
treatment was perceived as unjust by the colonists and ultimately fuelled the revolt of the 
American colonies in the 1770s.
218
 The Asian trade saw the East India Company running into 
greater financial difficulties in the 1770s and 1780s, leading to a modification of the 
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company’s monopoly of Indian trade in 1793 and finally its abolition in 1813.219 Cain and 
Hopkins write that:   
It was at this point that uncertainties about the shape of future economic policy came to the surface. The debate 
over the renewal of the East India Company’s charter in 1813, for example, provides a rare insight into the split 
within the City at this time between those who supported the company and the regulative system in general, and 
those who were eager to abolish restrictions and to open up new opportunities.
220
 
 
Yet, they urge to see such developments in North America and India only as modifications to 
a protectionist system and not an early move towards free trade. The regime had responded 
with a series of piecemeal reforms from the 1770s onwards,
221
 but Harley explains that while 
the 1780s saw administrators beginning tentatively to simplify and rationalise the customs, 
this did not change the basic philosophy of the system.
222
 Only after 1815, with the 
Napoleonic war’s having pushed levels of taxation to alarmingly high levels,223 the role of 
Empire was further adjusted, albeit again slowly and hesitantly.
224
 The French Revolution of 
1789 contributed significantly to the elite’s fear of instability and social unrest,225 and the 
period coincided with rapid industrialisation, with the resulting urbanisation altering British 
society.
226
 The free trade movement, spearheaded by Adam Smith, gained momentum and the 
mercantilist system which had fostered Britain’s role in world trade through its vast Empire, 
was increasingly under ideological attack. Finally, the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846 was 
seen as a great symbol in the dismantling of the restrictions of eighteenth century 
mercantilism.
227
  
 
On first sight, this seems to show an increase in power of the industrial and manufacturing 
interest, with free trade symbolising a new form of power arising through industrial 
development. Indeed, such a shift in policy signifies the start of a certain decline of landed 
influence but Cain and Hopkins urge their readers to see that it is the City, as the centre of a 
dynamic service economy, that was the leading beneficiary of the reforms initiated after 
1815.
228
 O’Brien writes that “with the costly exception of the War of American 
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Independence, there is no evidence that their [the Hanoverian statesmen’s] strategic policies 
did anything other than to assist British merchants to achieve the dominant position in global 
commerce they occupied after Waterloo.”229 While the manufacturing interest was a strong 
supporter of free trade as a means of creating markets and cutting costs, the decline of the 
landed interests did not deliver economic policy into the hands of representatives of the 
British industry.
230
 Webster also underlines that while a more liberal environment benefited 
the new class of industrialists in northern Britain, it was not created by them.
231
 More so, as 
other European states followed the route of industrialisation in the second half of the 
nineteenth century, industry was exposed to growing competition from abroad.
232
 While 
Britain’s export industries therefore started to feel the pressure of foreign competition, the 
City took spectacular advantage of the growth of international trade and Britain’s reputation 
for financial security and sound management: financing the economic development of many 
parts of the non-European world through the capital raised in London, the gentlemanly 
capitalists of the City rose to new heights of wealth and political influence.
233
 Free trade 
destroyed the old colonial system, but it elevated the City even further, creating a new form of 
imperialism and representing the start of a gradual demise of the landed aristocracy.
234
 
Through overseas investment, Britain and the City interests started to presume the leadership 
of a global economy, rather than merely a colonial one.
235
 Cain and Hopkins underline that: 
“from the middle of the nineteenth century, the main area of growth was the service sector, 
and the most rapidly developing region was the South East. […] After 1850, as one form of 
gentlemanly capitalism began to fail another rose to take its place.”236   
 
While such developments serve to outline the continuing, and more so increasing, importance 
of the City and its associates in the service sector, this paper aims to analyse its growing 
influence through the period of 1688 until 1850. This timeframe was chosen in order to give 
an overview of the incipiencies of the developments in England and its Empire through the 
theory of gentlemanly capitalism, and the resulting influences of the service sector on the 
British imperial economy. This is, of course, a huge endeavour and it remains important to 
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keep in mind that by describing such developments, historical progress is not to be simplified 
through a linear narrative. O’Brien points out that “narratives dealing with particular reigns, 
cabinets, wars, and campaigns will expose how unplanned, fortuitous, contingent, and even 
chaotic Britain’s climb to hegemony had really been.”237 In analysing the long period between 
1688 and 1850, emphasise is however put on structural conditions that carried Britain, its 
economy, and its Empire forward through time. After having outlined the gentlemanly 
capitalism paradigm, an important and interesting challenge remains in testing the 
gentlemanly capitalism paradigm against specific examples which incorporate local 
conditions in the periphery and provide insights into more time-specific developments of the 
British Empire. Excellent studies have been provided on the influences of gentlemanly 
capitalism on different world regions in order to evaluate the importance of the service sector 
in Britain and abroad.
238
 Analysing gentlemanly capitalism through a product however, will 
provide the opportunity to entangle relations between the spheres of production and that of 
services while underlining global interdependence beyond regional restrictions.  
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 II. 2. Commodity Chains and the Service Sector  
 
This part of the paper aims to show that, if the concept of commodity chains is modified to 
integrate the value of services, it provides a suitable analytical framework for critically 
reviewing the gentlemanly capitalism paradigm. The role of the service sector will be 
explored through a tangible product, therefore allowing room for the analysis of interrelated 
activities of production and services. The appliance of an analytical political economy tool on 
the other hand, establishes the means for the comparative analysis of the concept of 
gentlemanly capitalism without temporal or spatial constraints. Furthermore, exploring the 
gentlemanly capitalism paradigm through commodity chains works twofold: both concepts 
will benefit from such collaboration. The recognition of the importance of services for the 
ascent of the economy of the first industrial nation also sheds new light on debates concerning 
development. Acknowledging that services have played an integral part in the development of 
Britain and its Empire and do not just represent a product of post-industrial society, clearly 
has implications for traditional industry-centric accounts of development. Before discussing 
the incorporation of services into commodity chains in more detail however, it is important to 
give an overview of the concept, as well as its potentials and shortcomings. 
 
II. 2. a. Commodity Chain Analysis: An Overview 
 
The term ‘commodity chain’ dates from a 1977 article by Terrence Hopkins and Immanuel 
Wallerstein and thus has its origins in world system theory, providing a research agenda that 
should orient the world-systems program.
 239
 The aim was hereby to differentiate the 
understanding of capitalism’s territorial scope from the orthodox way of explaining the global 
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economy, which usually describes an evolvement from national markets towards an 
expansion of foreign trade in international markets.
240
 Instead, the process of globalisation is 
viewed in a different light, with the authors stating that they: 
 
[…] start with a radically different presumption. Let us conceive of something we shall call, for want of a better 
conventional term, ‘commodity chains.’ What we mean by such chains is the following: take an ultimate 
consumable item and trace back the set of inputs that culminated in this item - the prior transformations, the raw 
materials, the transportation mechanisms, the labor input into each of the material processes, the food inputs into 
the labor. This linked set of processes we call a commodity chain.
241
  
 
This conception allows for an analysis of economic activity beyond national boarders through 
modelling production processes in the global economy. Mainstream economics usually have 
been analysing large-scale commodity flows through international trade theories which in 
general assert that, in an international economy, economic development emerges from 
whatever absolute, comparative or competitive advantages a country may have. The basic 
assumptions underpinning these (neo-) classical trade theories therefore represent a state-
centric spatiality.
242
 Similarly, social sciences have for a large part evaluated political and 
economic data from the perspective of the sate as the unit of analysis.
243
 Yet, the geographies 
of trade are far more complex than only ‘one step’ trade between producers in one country 
and consumers in another and an ever-rising share of intra-firm trade reveals that the 
underlying supposition that nation states are the spatial actors controlling the global economy 
is equally indefensible.
244
 Rather, Hopkins and Wallerstein propose to view the world system 
as a unit in its entirety which determines the framework for social interaction. In doing so, 
world system analysis underlines the contradiction between the global organisation of 
production, fuelled by the growth of the capitalist world economy, and the splitting of the 
system into smaller political units called nation states, representing the geopolitical order of 
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individual countries.
245
 The explicitly transnational approach of world system theory 
describes the critical spatiality of world space through core–periphery structuring, represented 
by continuous capital accumulation. It thereby focuses attention on value creation and the 
spatial dynamics of uneven development.
246
  
 
Commodity chain analysis has expanded from an exclusively world-system approach, and 
more recent variants of chain research are represented by the concept of Global Commodity 
Chains (GCC), marked by Gary Gereffi and his colleagues,
247
 as well as the concept of Global 
Value Chains (GVC). Yet, these types of commodity chains still provide a methodological 
tool to analyse core-periphery relations on a transnational level: through their ability to map 
the international division of labour, they enable to study the operation of the global economy 
beyond the territorial confines of the nation state.
248
 Instead, dynamics of a given chain are 
determined and analysed through the input–output structure of the nodes or chain segments, 
their geographical location, institutional and socio-political framework, and their governance 
or control structure.
249
 The governance structure is hereby a significant factor as it gives the 
commodity chain its hierarchical and unequal character. Humphrey and Schmitz refer to 
governance as “[…] the inter-firm relationships and institutional mechanisms through which 
non-market coordination of activities in the chain takes place”.250 Without governance, a 
chain would therefore just constitute a string of market relations: the governance structure 
describes power relations existing along the chain, investigating which actors are most able to 
control various aspects of the production process.
251
 The relationships between such actors 
located at different points in the commodity chain, and its illustration through the governance 
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structure, allows the study of how value that is created through the chain is appropriated 
and/or distributed, and thus transferred from periphery to core.
252
  
 
Acknowledging that the process of production of all types of commodity chains is marked by 
power asymmetries, the most powerful actors within a chain are hereby often described as 
‘lead firms’, controlling how and which human, material and financial resources are 
employed within a given chain. Additionally, Gereffi further expanded on the concept of 
governance by distinguishing two typical forms though the division of producer-driven 
(PDCC) and buyer-driven (BDCC) commodity chains.
253
 PDCC generally represent capital- 
and technology intensive industries such as automobiles, aircraft, computers, semiconductors 
and heavy machinery, in which large, usually transnational manufacturers play a central role 
in coordinating, and thus often controlling, large parts of the chain. BDCC on the other hand 
describe often far-flung decentralised production networks, which are managed with varying 
degrees of closeness by designers, retailers and branded manufacturers. This usually concerns 
labour-intensive consumer goods such as garments, footwear, toys, house wares, consumer 
electronics and a variety of handicrafts, typically produced in the periphery, and supplied 
through contractors that make finished goods for foreign buyers.
254
  
  
An often unacknowledged difference between the commodity chain approach of world-
system analysis and that of more recent strands of research such as GCC and GVC lies 
however in each group’s conception of development, as well as the timeframe applied, further 
indicating a different view regarding the novelty of processes of globalization.
255
 Clearly, 
world-system scholars don’t perceive trans-state, geographically extensive, commodity chains 
as a recent phenomenon, but they are viewed as an integral part of the functioning of the 
capitalist world-economy which beginnings they generally allocate to the long sixteenth 
century.
256
 The GCC camp on the other hand is usually of the opinion that globalization is 
better understood as a contemporary phenomenon, describing the fragmentation of production 
processes and their geographic relocation on a global scale in ways that slice through national 
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boundaries.
257
 This approach often tries to identify contemporary opportunities to improve the 
situation of specific actors within individual chains through what has been called ‘upgrading’ 
and thus aims to contribute to the process of development on regional and national levels.
258
 
World-system scholars however, do not view commodity chains as a set of sequential value 
adding activities that are best understood as the opportunities confronting firms to pursue the 
objectives of progressing along the chain. Instead, this tradition of commodity chain research 
aims for an understanding of how the totality of relationships that constitute overlapping and 
interlocking commodity chains reflect core-periphery relations, which are determined not by 
particular mixes of activities, but by the systemic outcome of the struggle over the benefits of 
the world division of labour.
259
 Bair argues that contra the macro and holistic perspective of 
the world-systems approach, GCC, and even more so its newest variant Global Value Chains 
(GVC), have become increasingly analytically oriented towards the meso level of sectoral 
dynamics and/or the micro level of firm upgrading.
260
 
 
The world system tradition therefore does not share such analytical emphasis on upgrading or 
national development: acknowledging that mobility within the world system is possible, as 
individual countries pursue different paths of development, relevance from a world system 
perspective stems from the reproduction of a hierarchically-structured global capitalist 
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economy, which ultimately renders the notion of development insignificant.
261
 This does not 
mean that the core-periphery dichotomy represents unchanging geographical categories, but it 
describes the spatial structures underpinning a dynamic world economy.
262
 Despite massive 
changes over the centuries in the actual organization of production processes and continual 
shifts in the areas and processes constituting the core, semi-periphery and periphery, what is 
of importance for world system theorists is that unequal exchange, operating through a set of 
mechanisms, continually reproduces the basic core-periphery division of labour.
263
 
 
The most recent concept of chain research, Global Value Chains (GVC), has distanced itself 
even more from such theoretical origins, often paying little explicit attention to the underlying 
theoretical model of world-systems analysis and the long-term historical processes that shape 
the creation and evolution of these chains.
264
 Instead, GVC research focuses on finding ways 
to leverage the insights of the GCC approach into effective policy interventions.
265
 The 
development of the GVC paradigm stemmed from a desire to create a research community 
comprised of scholars studying the global economy through network- or chain based 
approaches such as the GCC or several others.
266
 This initiative began working together in 
2000 and describes itself as “[…] a loose network of researchers, activists, and policymakers 
that seeks to consolidate and foster the GVC perspective […] It is an ongoing effort to test 
and develop the GVC perspective with the aims of creating greater analytical precision, 
intellectual impact and policy relevance.”267 The emphasis on practical policy application and 
upgrading opportunities is clearly established when stating that the goal of GVC research is 
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“[…] to develop more effective tools for policymakers and activists seeking to alleviate 
poverty through sustainable industrial upgrading and employment creation.”268  
 
This part of the paper aimed to give a brief overview of the possibilities to study commodity 
chains, and the development of chain research through time. Bair points out that the different 
approaches to commodity chains may be seen to represent three generations of chain research 
since they roughly succeed each other in a temporal ordering, with the original commodity 
chain concept dating from the 1980s, the GCC framework being elaborated in the 1990s, and 
the GVC variant becoming more popular in recent years. Such a generational schema would 
however be misleading: the literature overlaps and work in all three traditions of chain 
research continues, including some by scholars who have been influenced by, and whose 
present research references, more than one of these frameworks.
269
 Wallerstein and Hopkins 
feature prominently in Gereffi and Korzeniewicz (eds.) ‘Commodity Chains and Global 
Capitalism’ and Gereffi in turn is co-organizer of the Global Value Chain initiative. It is 
therefore important to be aware of these different strands of commodity chain research: 
positioning research in regard to these different approaches may help to clarify perspective 
and aim; yet, this does not necessarily mark a clear break from every other given approach.  
 
II. 2. b. Shortcomings of Commodity Chain Research 
 
Dedicating a whole section to the shortcomings of commodity chains does not mean to 
dispute the usefulness of the concept. Quite the opposite is the case; it can be argued that 
commodity chains, and their ability to study the global economy beyond the conventional 
state-centric spatiality, have contributed greatly to an understanding of economic 
globalisation, outlining structures of how power and control is exercised, and thus value is 
created, in global industries. The more recent GCC and GVC approaches have further 
produced a substantial amount of empirical research on production networks of a wide variety 
of industries.
270
 Going beyond academic analysis, such research has often been successfully 
applied, for example by creating accountability in global industries through the demand that 
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lead firms take responsibility for what happens in the factories of their suppliers and 
subcontractors around the world.
271
 While the GCC framework remains to have a more 
sociological orientation, GVC research now substantially influences business literature.
272
 Its 
ability to inform policy debates about the best way for developing countries to access and 
benefit from their participation in foreign markets has made the GVC framework an attractive 
tool for international organisations such as the UN and the WTO.
 273
 While appreciating these 
contributions of the different strands of commodity chain research, as well as their 
development towards practical approaches, such successes also underline a need to critically 
evaluate, and at times maybe improve, the concept of commodity chains. This part will thus 
discuss possible improvements and their implications on researching Cain and Hopkins’s 
account of British imperialism through commodity chains.   
 
As outlined, the development of commodity chains, GCC and GVC has had several 
implications for research, moving from a more holistic and descriptive analysis of the 
capitalist world economy, towards an increasingly sectoral and practical approach of 
development and firm upgrading. This move away from the world system origin of chain 
research and the increasing emphasis on upgrading, has to some extend been a source of 
criticism. While Wallerstein warns that “the only thing we have to fear is looking too 
narrowly”274, Rammohan and Sundaresan criticise the upgrading discourse in its recent form 
for exactly doing that. They urge to consider the concept of upgrading from a broader 
perspective that goes beyond the ‘economic’ component of development and includes social 
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implications such as for example the living conditions of workers in the periphery or gender-
based division of labour.
275
 More careful attention needs to be paid to the question of who the 
process of upgrading benefits, since efforts to upgrade of specific firms do not automatically 
translate into improvements of working conditions.
276
 The move away from holistic analysis 
towards a discourse of upgrading, often remaining on the level of the individual firms in the 
context of a particular value chain, may also lead to underemphasise other actors as well as 
the broader institutional regulative contexts in which the chain is embedded.
277
  
 
While commodity chains provide a useful tool to overcome state-centric perceptions that may 
blur an accurate outline of global economic structures, this does not imply that institutions or 
regulations do not yield influence over the structure of a chain and that (transnational) firms 
have become the central actors in regard to development processes.
278
 The debate revolving 
around the importance of institutions for economic development, which has been outlined in 
part II. 1. c., therefore continues, albeit in modified form, when discussing the framework of 
commodity chains. Bair explains that GCC and GVC literature often doesn’t pay much 
attention to the government as potential facilitators (or inhibitors) of development, instead 
concentrating on lead firms as agents of upgrading. Such chain literature does not necessarily 
express scepticism or hostility towards the state, but the aim of growth via market-driven 
global integration often places little emphasise on state intervention.
279
 While this is an aim in 
its own right, and may represent a suitable approach given commodity chains inherently 
transnational character, it should be acknowledged that regulatory mechanisms, particularly 
trade policy, shape the geography and configuration of many commodity chains in the global 
economy.
280
 The outlook and length of commodity chains are clearly influenced on local, 
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national and supranational level by institutions and regulations.
281
 Gereffi also points towards 
the importance of state action as a variable shaping the organisation of enterprises within 
commodity chains and suggests that state policies significantly effect the organisation of 
commodity chains at each of its networks and nodes.
282
 A trans-national perspective should 
thus not exclude continuous institutional influences, but rather provides an opportunity to 
analyse them beyond national boarders in regard to different segments of the chain. Bair 
states that “[…] we would benefit from research focusing on the broader political-economic 
environment in which chains operate, including the institutional and systemic factors that 
shape commodity chains and condition the outcomes associated with them.”283  
 
An analysis of the importance of the British military fiscal state through a commodity chain 
approach, naturally calls for a broad perspective that includes institutional contexts and other 
exogenous factors influencing the commodity chains. However, Peter reminds us that: 
Overly broad generalizations about longterm changes in social and natural processes (industrialization, 
imperialism, colonialism, neo-colonialism, globalization, etc.) typically conceal as much as they explain. Even 
the fairly specific concept of ‘late 19th and early 20th century British imperialism’ meant very different things 
for the how and why of creating new states after the Second World War in India and Nigeria […]284 
 
Herein lays a possible strength of commodity chain research: while the whole chain can, and 
should, be analysed within the broad context in which it is embedded, each single node and 
segment of the chain can offer very particular and case specific insights. Like it is the case 
with the global-local nexus, where commodity chains allow us to analyse transnational forces 
and their regional influences, the combination of micro and macro dimensions of chain 
research has the ability to test broad concepts against specific cases. This makes the 
commodity chain approach such an attractive analytical political economy tool in order to 
research Cain and Hopkins’s account of British imperialism and gentlemanly capitalism: 
these broad systemic concepts can be investigated within different commodity chains beyond 
regional and time restrictions, further encompassing different forms of Empire (such as for 
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example white settler or purely ‘extractive’ colonies) and labour forms (for instance slave or 
peasant labour).  
 
Analysing the gentlemanly capitalism paradigm also calls for an inclusion of other exogenous 
influences of commodity chains: social factors, such as the role of ethnicity and shared social 
backgrounds and values, may also be explored within the concept. Gereffi explains that 
within GCCs, kinship and ethnic identity appear as crucial social resources that can be 
deployed in order to gain or sustain a competitive edge.
285
 Various commodity chains have 
successfully explored how social components can shape different commodity chains. 
Xiangming Chen for example suggested that the structure of investment in mainland China by 
enterprises in Hong Kong and Taiwan was significantly shaped by pre-existing ties based on 
kinship.
286
 Gellert’s analysis of Indonesia’s participation in the timber commodity chain 
shows how an oligopoly of timber-producing firms that forged an alliance with the state 
created an industrial association that effectively ‘upgraded’ Indonesian firms along the chain 
from exporting timber to manufacturing plywood. Gellert argues that the ability of Indonesia 
to become a major exporter in the global (particularly Japanese) timber market reflects the 
patron-client relationship between a politically well-connected industrialist, Mohammad 
‘Bob’ Hassan, and President Suharto.287 Cain and Hopkins’s gentlemanly order in Britain and 
abroad, or Magee and Thompson’s imperial networks of settler societies, can thus be 
illustrated within global commodity chains.
288
 
 
The analysis of the British military fiscal state and its imperial policies, fuelled through what 
Cain and Hopkins call gentlemanly capitalism, clearly necessitates a broad approach to 
commodity chains which acknowledges the role of institution as well as social factors. This is 
in line with Bair’s call for an expansion of the scope of analysis to encompass the regulatory 
mechanisms, market institutions and structural properties of capitalism that affect the 
configuration and operation of commodity chains, as well as the developmental outcomes 
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associated with them.
289
 Yet, Cain and Hopkins’s analysis of British development centres on 
the importance of its service sector. They argue that the first industrial nation was as much a 
service as a commodity producing economy, and that the structural element of British 
political and economic power stemmed from an alliance of the established wealth of the old 
aristocracy with the London based service sector.
290
 Vries outlines that:  
In early modern mercantile capitalism – as I would claim in all capitalism – big profits are not made in 
producing something but in buying and selling it and in finance […] even in the nineteenth century, the first 
industrial nation normally had a deficit of balance of trade that was more than compensated by its income from 
services and by income from foreign assets.
291
 
 
Viewing the commodity chain framework as a methodology for studying the dynamics and 
consequences of a capitalist world economy
292
 therefore calls for an explicit integration of the 
service sector within research. Brown et al. argue that a “[…] specific limitation in Global 
Commodity Chain research is that the empirical scope of analysis has been somewhat limited, 
with the majority of studies focusing on a number of primary commodities and industrial 
sectors.”293 Despite an early call for exploring the ‘service-sector nexus’, already featuring a 
chapter within Gereffi’s et al. ‘Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism’, services have not 
been analysed particularly effectively in commodity chain research.
294
 Brown states that it is 
perhaps the most crucial omission in chain literature, that little attention has been paid to 
understanding the role of service intermediaries or ‘producer services’ in setting up and 
sustaining global networks of production.
295
 The critical role of financial services in the 
various stages of the production cycle, has indeed gained little or no recognition in 
commodity chain analysis.
296
 Part II. 2. c. will therefore look at possibilities to, and 
implications of, effectively integrating services into commodity chain research.    
 
II. 2. c. Services in Commodity Chains 
 
The absence of services within commodity chains has been criticised and their importance for 
the functioning of any given commodity chain has been noted. Yet, empirical studies treating 
services within commodity chains remain limited. Services offer key inputs ranging from the 
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initial lending of capital, to transportation, insurance and marketing.
297
 They provide the 
linkages between the segments of production within a commodity chain, as well as bind 
together the spheres of production and circulation. In short, services therefore integrate and 
coordinate production processes.
298
 It has been argued, that a quantitative augmentation in 
trade, capital flows and direct investments also led to an increase in the need of services. In 
this view, the globalisation of production has led to an increasing proportion of transactions 
being of cross-boarder nature.
299
 The rise of transactional intensity and internationalization of 
production depends upon a very high level of coordination which, in turn, is achieved by 
service activities. The argument therefore is that service activities can no longer be considered 
to provide merely auxiliary linkages in (global) commodity chains, but are integral to the 
coordination and operation of such chains.
300
 This argumentation already outlines that the call 
for an integration of services in commodity chains is almost exclusively restricted to chain 
research within the GCC or GVC camp. Discussions advocating the importance of services in 
commodity chains, often offering valuable insights, almost always stress this to be a recent 
phenomenon. Brown et al. write for example that “One of the features of the contemporary 
world economy is that ‘services’ are becoming more and more important.”301 Two interrelated 
discourses need to be discussed when looking at this line of reasoning: one regards the 
question of the novelty and salience of globalisation which, as has been briefly explained, 
represents somewhat of a disjuncture between the world system origins of commodity chains 
and the GCC and GVC variant. The second point regards the novelty and salience of the 
importance and value of services.  
 
Globalisation can be defined in its briefest form, as meaning the causes and consequences of 
developments of interdependence and interconnectedness of societies and states.
 302
 There is a 
tendency to assume that globalisation is deepening, not least because of recent and rapid 
advances in transport and communications which have transformed the speed, and often 
lowered the cost, of human correspondence and travel.
303
 Magee and Thompson argue 
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however, that while cutting-edge technology such as today’s electronic and news media can 
provide the means for greater integration, there is a growing recognition that the roots of 
globalisation extend back in time.
304
 The progress of globalisation can therefore been traced 
through distinct phases, the latest of which may be more inclusive than its predecessors, but 
which is by no means completely distinct from them.
305
 Extensive commodity chains may 
thus be traced back in time and have existed over centuries. This does of course not mean to 
contest the effects of improvements in technology on the integration of such chains. Rather, it 
proposes to see such improvements within an expanded timeframe: the increasing size of 
shipping since the 1400s has had tremendous effects on commodity chains which 
subsequently became progressively global.
306
 While Dutch shipbuilders led this process of 
technological innovation from the 1500s, British shipbuilders became global leaders in naval 
shipbuilding technology in the 1600s and then pioneered the development of steamships in 
the 1800s for both military and bulk shipping purposes.
307
 Likewise, developments in 
communication technologies also helped to shape the evolution of the capitalist world 
economy, evolving from the use of trading agents sending letters on sailing ships to 
steamships, undersea telegraph cables, telephones, satellite communications, and the internet, 
organizing the movement of millions of tons of goods around the world every day.
308
 Such 
technologies have been providing access to, and control over, key pieces of information and 
therefore represented tremendous competitive advantages to Dutch traders, British shippers 
and manufacturers, imperial armies, and a variety of other groups over the course of the 
evolution of the capitalist world-economy.
309
  
 
Describing the process in transportation and communication as a driving force of global 
integration, and further as an important factor for the competitiveness of ascending nations, 
already hints towards the second point: like globalisation, the importance of services is not 
novel. Rather, as has been described in part II. 1, service activities such as transportation and 
finance, which are inextricably linked to each other in their development through the need to 
raise capital for long distance trade and war, have provided the means which helped Britain 
on its path to hegemony. Information, transmitted through improved communication 
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technology, hereby represents a further competitive advantage in the facilitation of such 
service activities. But how and why do commodity chains provide a medium that allows for 
the analysis of services, and therefore questions conventional views of (national) development 
and post-industrial society? Gereffi argues that (Global) Commodity Chains challenge the 
hierarchical distinction between raw material production, industry and services.
310
 He points 
out that:  
A GCC approach ultimately allows us to critically evaluate theoretical concepts that have hitherto prevailed in 
the comparative study of development, and that are deeply embedded in conventional analysis and vocabulary. 
Two such concepts, national development and industrialisation, have become increasingly problematic in 
facilitating an understanding of emerging patterns of social and economic organization.
311
  
 
It has already been discussed that the inherently transnational approach of commodity chains 
can overcome often misleading concepts of national spatiality and therefore integrate other 
non-state actors into the notion of development. Furthermore, an understanding of the 
organisation and transformation of commodity chains that centres on patterns of competition 
and innovation also has the capability to question the juxtaposition that equals development 
with industrialisation. The commodity chain approach outlines how profitability shifts from 
node to node according to competitive pressures; ‘industry’ is hereby not always perceived as 
a motor for development.
312
 This leaves room for investigating the role of innovations in 
service activities such as transportation and finance as well as communications in fuelling 
economic ascent and providing necessary competitive impetus.  
 
What remains however, is the major question of what is the best way to analyse services 
within commodity chains? If services have been explored in commodity chain research so far, 
there has been a tendency to treat them as separate chains within which knowledge is the 
commodity traded. This potentially has negative effects on both, the analysis of services as 
well as the discussion of any other given product within a commodity chain: it means that the 
analysis of individual commodity chains has effectively been isolated from the necessary 
service providers who enable the development and reproduction of the chain.
313
 To track the 
production and distribution of services in the same way as other chain studies have done for 
single commodities or entire industries, would thus mean to loose the great significance of 
services to commodity chains in general.
314
 This is the case because services encompass a 
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countless range of activities that are, in a sense, grafted over the entire process of 
production.
315
 It is worth noting that a distinction may be made in regard to services that offer 
some sort of end product, as is for example the case with a package holiday or a haircut, but 
when speaking of ‘intermediate’ or ‘producer’ services such as banking, insurance, transport 
or marketing, which are all integral to the production process, the knowledge commodity is 
not an end product in itself but rather facilitates the production process.
316
 Rabach therefore 
suggests that “in order to study the significance and impact of services on GCCs, a shift in the 
customary focus and methodology characterising GCC research is imperative.”317  
 
While Rabach’s observations in regard to the integration of the service sector in commodity 
chains are very useful, the fact that she does, like many others, exclusively focus on the 
contemporary dimension of the importance of services, remains somewhat restrictive. Her 
argumentation can clearly be allocated in the GCC camp of chain research, and the analysis of 
the role of services is conceptualised solemnly in regard to buyer- and producer-driven 
chains.
318
 Yet, in order to asses the value and governance capabilities of services through time 
and their implications for national development, they also need to be integrated within a 
historical context. This implies a systemic approach of analysing the capitalist world 
economy, characterised by the holistic conceptualisation of a world system perspective to 
commodity chains, rather than a focus on firm- and chain specific developments. Still, much 
can be learned from the more recent strands of chain research. For instance, Gereffi’s concept 
of governance in buyer-driven commodity chains provides a useful theorization of 
commercial capital that indicates power and control beyond what has been regarded as 
traditional patterns of ownership,
319
 thus providing a possible framework of thinking about 
governance when analysing the role of British merchants and financiers. More importantly, 
Rabach states that “GCC research represents an important leap forward in efforts aimed at 
disentangling the maze of international productions and transactions that characterize 
international capitalism.”320 Her suggestion to analyse services in terms of the linkages 
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between the segments of production within a commodity chain
321
 thus provides an analytical 
framework in order to follow Cain and Hopkins’s call to unravel the relation between industry 
and services in more detail and with greater subtlety over centuries.
322
  
 
Rabach’s outline that services integrate and coordinate dispersed production activities and 
therefore provide the impetus for the continual transformation of the chains, also implicates 
the acknowledgement that services have a critical influence over a given chain at almost every 
node or box.
323
 An important question that remains to be established however, is from where 
this influence is exercised or in other words from where the production processes of any given 
chain are organised and coordinated? Brown et al. propose to see the ‘world city’ as key to 
understand the management of the global economy through service activities.
324
 Indeed, 
Sassen argues that world cities (or, in her own words, ‘global’ cities) are “[…] highly 
concentrated command points in the organization of the world economy.”325 While she does 
not use commodity chain terminology, this clearly indicates that world cities provide core 
inputs required for almost all production processes, linking dispersed production and 
consumption sites and therefore acting as the facilitators of numberless chains.
326
  
 
Cities can be described as ‘global service centres’ which form complex networks of capital 
circulation and accumulation
327
: while they provide value at all nodes of the commodity 
chains, this feeds back further leading to consequent flows of profits to cities.
328
 Brown et al. 
argue that “the creation and (unequal) distribution of value along commodity chains is 
organized in and governed from world cities […].”329 Their call for an integration of the city 
within commodity chains can thus be helpful in order to facilitate the study of services within 
such chains. While cities are often described as ‘control and command centres’ in commodity 
chains through their housing of multinational corporate headquarters, little light is shed on the 
issue of how this translates into the operation of, and control over, commodity chains or how 
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cities are implicated in the creation of core-periphery structures through commodity chains.
330
 
Brown et al. explain that Wallerstein didn’t clearly elaborate what ‘core’ meant in 
geographical terms, but that its equation with ‘core states’ would mean to misconceive the 
concept altogether.
331
 Clearly this is a valid point since the core-periphery dichotomy stems 
from the very need to overcome conventional views of state-centric spatiality. It can thus be 
argued that ‘world cities’ and their capacities to organise and coordinate commodity chains 
through service sector activities, often constitute the very core of a chain or economic system. 
Such an approach ties in with Cain and Hopkins’s account of London as an ‘international 
service centre’ which drove and created an international trading system, mediated through the 
sterling.
332
  
 
Giving the service sector, allocated in world cities, a key function in the organisation and 
coordination of commodity chains further necessitates questions of agency within such a 
sector and implies the integration of new actors into the chains. The important question 
hereby is of grand nature and follows Bair’s appeal to consider larger institutional and 
structural environments in which commodity chains are embedded.
333
 Simply put, it asks what 
constitutes the driving force behind the creation and organisation of an international regime of 
trade and who are the driving agents of such? As has been described in part II. 1., Cain and 
Hopkins historical perspective, analysing the ascent of the British imperial system, runs 
contra traditional accounts of industrialisation and proposes the integration of a socio-
economic ruling elite, constituting what they describe as gentlemanly capitalism, into the 
story of Britain’s economic rise. If the governance structure is analysed to include all value-
added activities and services are not simply reduced auxiliary to the production of 
commodities, but rather are viewed as providing essential linkages between the different 
segments of the chain, the commodity chain approach can help to disentangle the complex 
relationship between manufacturing and service activities and thus test the gentlemanly 
capitalism paradigm against specific case studies. Some progress has been made in regard to 
integrating financial services into commodity chains as well as treating financial institutions 
as a set of separate actors within such chains. For instance, starting from the assumption that 
the provision of financial services represents an important input for the functioning of a 
commodity chain, Parnreiter et al. set out to explore these in terms of linkages through a study 
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of the involvement of (local and global) financial institutions in issuing the bonds and shares 
of leading corporations in Mexico and Chile.
334
 Looking at the period from 1982 to 2004, the 
study exposes that most of the bond and share issues of the 50 top ranked Mexican and 
Chilean enterprises were handled by global financial institutions such as Citibank/Citigroup, 
JP Morgan/Chase Manhattan, Bank of New York, Banco Santander or ING Bank.
335
 It 
confirms that global financial institutions such as Citibank/Citigroup generate high value 
work through providing key inputs for several GCC by enabling investment for different 
firms such as the Mexican oil company PEMEX or the Chilean copper company Codelco 
through selling bonds and shares at stock markets and by selling financial services to major 
retailers (for example Wal-mart Mexico, Controlada Comercial Mexicana).
336
 Most 
importantly, the study outlined that demand for financial service intermediaries was 
concentrated in firms operating both at a global and a local scale: big corporations in Mexico 
and Chile thus preferred those global financial institutions that maintain offices in Mexico 
City and/or Santiago de Chile.
337
 This is in line with Brown et al.’s argument that commodity 
chains often run through local cities which are allocated near to production nodes, but which 
form a critical connection to major cities, which may be distant from such production 
nodes.
338
 Despite its contemporary focus, such analysis gives valuable insights which can help 
to reflect on historical case studies. These global-local connections could hint towards the 
importance of imperial structures, representing a global British network of merchants, 
merchant bankers and financiers, operating at home and abroad.  
 
The growing recognition that services form an integral and important part of commodity 
chains is of course a very positive development. Already in 1994 Rabach asked ‘where is the 
chain in commodity chains’, thus providing a foundation for the study of services in 
commodity chains.
339
 Brown et al.’s appeal to integrate world cities into commodity chains to 
investigate their role as ‘international service centres’ also provides much of the crucial 
groundwork on how service activities may be analysed within commodity chains. However, 
                                                 
334
 Brown, Ed, Derudder, Ben, Parnreiter, Christof et al. World City Networks and Global Commodity Chains: 
towards a world-systems’ integration, p.26; See also Parnreiter, C., Fischer, K., Imhof K. El enlace faltante 
entre cadenas globales de produccion y ciudades globales: el servicio financiero en Ciudad de Mexico y 
Santiago de Chile, pp. 135-48    
335
 Brown, Ed, Derudder, Ben, Parnreiter, Christof et al. World City Networks and Global Commodity Chains: 
towards a world-systems’ integration, p.26 
336
 Ibid. p.26 
337
 Ibid. pp.26-7 
338
 Ibid. p.24 
339
 Rabach, Eileen, Kim, Eun Mee Where is the Chain in the Commodity Chain? The Service Sector Nexus in 
Gereffi, Gary, Korzeniewicz, Miguel (eds.) Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, p.123 
  
- 60 - 
 
all such studies continuously refer to the notion of the ‘contemporary’, underlining the 
‘increasing’ importance of the service sector, often urging to pay special attention to the 
process of liberalisation in the past couple of decades.
340
 Cain and Hopkins’s argument of 
gentlemanly capitalism however, calls for an analysis of services within commodity chains 
from a historical perspective. The long-term importance of services spanning through the 
centuries has substantial implications for the analysis of value-creation and governance in 
commodity chains and consequently also for ambitions to explore the opportunities for firms, 
actors or policy makers in regard to upgrading opportunities or potential barriers faced to do 
so. Recognizing the value of services might not have direct influences on upgrading 
opportunities. Furthermore, as has been explained, a world system approach may even 
condemn any such development opportunities as illusionary.
341
 While debating such issues of 
the possibilities of development in detail is beyond the scope of this paper, I am of the opinion 
that debates over long term development becomes redundant altogether if not all value-adding 
activities, including services, and their influence on governance structures within a chain, are 
clearly outlined. 
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III. Gentlemanly Capitalism and Indigo: a Commodity Chain approach 
 
A comparative analysis of the production and trade of indigo in South Carolina and Bengal 
will serve to test Cain and Hopkins’s concept of gentlemanly capitalism through the 
commodity chain approach. The aim is to emphasise both, the importance of production and 
that of services, in the creation of a commodity. Furthermore, the institutional framework, 
which underpins the conditions under which a commodity flourishes or fails, will be 
considered. Almost any (global) commodity could hereby provide important insights. Yet, 
indigo is particularly interesting: demand for the blue dyestuff is intrinsically linked to the 
expanding textile industry in Europe and industrialisation in general, and its supply rested on 
centuries of imperial competition. By the 18th century the blue of indigo, naturally lightfast 
and fade proof, had established itself as the uniform of work and authority.
342
 Even today, 
after the blue dyestuff has been replaced by synthetic substitutes and disappeared from the 
markets over a century ago, policemen’s uniforms are blue and blue jeans remain an integral 
part of the average wardrobe.
343
 Interestingly enough, the word ‘indigo’ itself has been readily 
adapted to take on a wide range of new meanings. From New Age enterprises to consulting 
agencies, the term ‘indigo’ has become associated with good living and style.344 It describes 
‘gifted’ children (‘indigo children’), marijuana seeds, and software development (‘indigo byte 
systems’). Such connotations stand in stark contrast to the systems of slavery and coerced 
labour that accompanied the production of indigo dye as a major item of international trade 
from the sixteenth to the late nineteenth century.
345
  
 
Indigo dye can be extracted from several different plant species and it is thus most likely that 
the discovery of the dyestuff evolved independently in many civilizations.
346
 While hundreds 
of plants worldwide contain the basic chemical elements of indigo however, only a few are 
productive enough to make commercial exploitation, as opposed to home textile production, 
worthwhile.
347
 Most important hereby is the Indigofera which grows only in tropical and 
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subtropical regions.
348
 Early modern Europe imported indigo from India (hence the name 
‘indigo’) via the silk routes.349 When Portugal opened an all-water route to the East, the cost 
of a variety of ‘spices’, including indigo, was lowered and their availability increased.350 
Around the same time, the Spanish were settling the New World and among the first 
agricultural exports of these colonies was indigo.
351
 During the sixteenth century indigo thus 
became a global commodity, marked by imperial competition.
352
 The Spanish, which were 
eager to get around Portuguese supplies, introduced Asian indigo plants to their new colonies 
in Central America, particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala which were relatively poor in 
mineral resources.
353
 Soon thereafter, they were able to supply European markets with better 
quality indigo at lower prices and therefore almost entirely drove out Indian indigo.
354
  
 
The rise of mercantilism, as well as labour shortages and transportation problems, stemming 
from the general paralysis of the Spanish Empire in the second quarter of the seventeenth 
century, prompted non-Spanish European powers to seek sources of the dye within their own 
Empire.
355
 Planters in the French West Indies experimented with the crop and soon set the 
standard for European, and despite mercantilist concerns, English markets.
356
 Haiti (then 
known as Saint Dominique) annually exported about one million kg of indigo in the third 
quarter of the eighteenth century. Guatemala and South Carolina followed by exporting about 
half of that amount.
357
 When war erupted between Spain and Britain in 1793, indigo supply 
from Guatemala was interrupted, leading to a decline in Guatemala’s indigo production which 
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was further fuelled by crop failures and the slow disintegration of the Spanish Empire.
358
 
Haiti’s indigo production was, according to van Schendel, ‘wiped out in a flash’ through the 
slave revolts leading to Haiti’s independence from France in 1804.359 The American 
Revolution on the other hand, undercut supplies from South Carolina.
360
 When the global 
indigo market was in crisis, the East India Company, plagued with the problem of remittance, 
thus moved to revive Indian indigo production in Bengal.
361
  
 
These developments will become more apparent through the analysis of the South Carolina 
and Bengal indigo chains, albeit focus hereby lies on the British Empire. Following the 
product’s journey from its initial production in the backcountry of South Carolina and Eastern 
India to its destination at the markets of London, David McCeery provides much of the 
expertise that represents the groundwork for further analysis. When outlining the two 
commodity chains in part III.1 and 2, no direct reference will be given to Cain and Hopkins 
concept of gentlemanly capitalism. Instead, focus lies on the description of the factors of 
production, namely labour, land, technology and capital, as well as trade with the commodity. 
After the commodity chains have been outlined, part III. 3 will look at the governance 
structures of both chains in order to examine the importance of gentlemanly capitalism 
through the indigo commodity. A comparative analysis of the governance structure will give 
valuable insights over agency and control in both indigo commodity chains and thus allows 
for an examination of structural elements of British imperialism which encompass different 
types of Empire and timeframes.  
 
III. a. The Indigo Commodity Chain: South Carolina 1740-1775 
 
South Carolina was one of the fastest growing regional economies of British America during 
the century from its founding in 1670 to the American Revolution
362
 and few are aware that in 
the 1770s it was the richest colony in all of mainland British North America.
363
 In January 
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1755, one of the most widely read London journals of the eighteenth century, the Gentleman’s 
Magazine, described South Carolina in the following terms:  
Its principal produce is rice, with which it supplies almost all of Europe; and if the article of indigo, which they 
have lately fallen on, will succeed, this will soon become one of the richest colonies we have.... Charles Town is 
the capital of this province about as big as the city of Gloucester. The inhabitants are very genteel and polite. All 
this country has every necessary, and most of the conveniences of life. Many fine rivers, and good harbours. All 
the goods they consume, they have from England, and pay for them in rice, pitch, tar, deer-skins, and fur.
364 
 
Nash describes the history of the colonial South Carolina economy and its overseas trade in 
two periods: in the first fifty years from the settlement of the colony in 1670 till 1720, trade 
grew slowly, by then making up approximately 12% of the total of all mainland exports; the 
second fifty years saw a rapid growth of trade with export increasing eightfold, by 1768-1772 
comprising about 30% of exports from the mainland.
365
 The colonies development was based 
on a number of plantation-export staples, linking South Carolina to the expanding Atlantic 
economy and fuelling the trade of manufactured goods and other imports from Britain (dry 
goods), slaves from Africa and the West Indies, and rum and sugar from the West Indies. The 
colony's first significant staples were deerskins and provisions, but from about 1700 slave-
produced rice and naval stores became the most important exports, and from 1720 onwards 
rice established a dominance which was to last for the rest of the colonial period.
366
  However, 
in the late 1740s indigo began to be produced in quantity, and by the late 1750s it had become 
South Carolina's second most important export item.
367
  
 
South Carolina’s planters had begun to experiment with indigo in the late seventeenth century 
and the first reports of Carolina indigo planters reached England in 1671.
368
  At this stage, 
Britain had already passed mercantilist legislation for the dye due to the indigo plantations on 
its colonies in Jamaica. The Navigation Act of 1660 specified, in part, that producers of 
certain enumerated goods, including indigo, could sell those goods only within the Empire. In 
1670 Parliament decided however, that Jamaica planters should produce sugar instead of 
indigo and enforced this preference through a duty placed on indigo exports from the island. 
Such a combination of the Navigation Act and the Jamaican tariff opened the way for others 
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to develop an indigo industry elsewhere in the Empire.
369
 Yet, the profitability of rice meant 
that the indigo production in South Carolina was abandoned until 1740s, when exploding 
demand for indigo in England, linked to the growth of the industrial revolution as well as a 
crisis in rice markets, prompted South Carolina landowners to revisit the dye.
370
   
 
The successful introduction of indigo in South Carolina is generally linked to the experiments 
of Eliza Lucas Pinckney.
371
 Her father, George Lucas, a large landholder in both Antigua and 
South Carolina, who served as a lieutenant colonel of the British army and was politically 
well connected, had sent his daughter various seeds from the West Indies in order to find a 
profitable substitute crop for the colony.
372
 Thanks to Eliza Lucas Pinckney’s letterbook, her 
experiments, which were at first marked by difficulties, are well documented and in 1744 she 
could write to her father that: 
We please ourselves with the prospect of exporting in a few years a good quantity from hence and supplying our 
mother country with a manufacture for which she has so great a demand, and which she is now supplied from the 
French Collonys and many thousand per annum thereby lost to the Nation, when she might be as well supplied 
here if the matter were applied to in earnest.
373
 
 
Indeed, the South-Carolina Garzette featured an excerpt of a letter from London on December 
the 3
rd
 1744 stating that:  
I have shown your INDIGO to some of our most noted Brokers in that Way, who tried it against some of the 
Best FRENCH, and in this opinion it is AS GOOD […] When you can in some measure supply the British 
Demand, we are persuaded, that on proper Application to Parliament, a Duty will be laid on foreign Growth, for 
I am informed, that we pay for INDIGO to the French £ 200,000 per annum.
374
 
 
In contrast to this kind of enthusiasm, Edelson writes that when the first Carolina indigo cakes 
arrived in London in the mid-1740s, they were held in rather low esteem. Marked by a bad 
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reputation, they never sold as well as indigo from Guatemala or St. Domingue.
 375
 However, 
great demand ensured that the indigo trade nevertheless flourished. In South Carolina, indigo 
had the advantage of supplementing rather than conflicting or competing with the existing 
rice production since the crops made use of a different sort of land. It therefore did not 
threaten the dominant economic or social system of the colony, but rather brought prosperity 
to impoverished areas of the backcountry.
376
 
 
After providing a historical background of South Carolina and its indigo, it is now time to 
look more closely at the indigo commodity chain. The first node of the chain is hereby 
represented by the South Carolina indigo plantation. Thompson defines the plantation as a 
large landed estate, located in an area of open resource, where social relations between 
diverse racial or cultural groups are based upon authority, involving the subordination of 
resident labourers to a planter for the purpose of producing an agricultural staple which is sold 
in the world market.
377
 This already indicates that the history of the plantation is closely 
linked to the discovery of new lands, representing a colonial institution fuelled by the 
expansion of commerce, which in turn is resting on improvement of transportation.
378
 Due to 
its prominent features of slave production under state protection, the concept of plantation 
enterprise has sometimes been subject to underlying misconceptions which do not attribute 
the plantation with a sense of modernity. However, Drayton urges to see the plantation as a 
modern capitalist enterprise in regard to its production for the world market, its dependence 
on long distance trade for inputs and exports, its extensive economies of scale, its large sized 
labour force marked by specialisation and time discipline, as well as its wholly expatriate 
character.
379
 Indeed, the plantations of South Carolina provide a prime example for early 
modern capitalist production within the Atlantic economy.  In the century from the 
establishment of the English colony to its independence as an American state, the regions ever 
expanding frontier became a place of huge plantations, marked by an intense focus on 
growing export staples.
380
 While the most adventurous speculators hunted for lands far 
beyond the plantation pale, colonists invested in building roads and clearing rivers in order to 
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link the outward expanding plantation settlements to Charleston, the colony’s only important 
city, port and commercial centre.
381
 Indigo hereby was an especially suited crop for the 
backcountry, where it generated unprecedented wealth. Small landowners, away from the 
coast or the rivers and without rice land, planted indigo together with their subsistence crops, 
often specialising in furnishing seed to the large growers and therefore for the first time 
aligning the interests of large scale planters and backcountry farmers.
382
 However, a largely 
profitable indigo production required many acres of cleared land, several slaves, a processing 
works, and a high degree of technical knowledge, which meant that not all farmers could 
produce dye products on a large commercial scale.
383
 In summary this means that the 
cultivation and processing of indigo at the plantation ‘node’ therefore required land, capital, 
labour and suitable technological knowledge.
384
   
 
South Carolina’s ever expanding frontier and its suitability for the indigo cultivation has 
shown that access to land was generally unproblematic.
385
 In the period of 1730 to 1760, the 
Beaufort area in the Southern Frontier zone specialized in the production of indigo and was 
undergoing rapid development. Some of the biggest investors in the area were leading 
Charleston merchants like Thomas Jenys, William Cattell or John Guerard, absentee estate-
owners who drew a large income from the region.
386
 The input of capital in the plantation 
node of the indigo commodity chain thus comes, not surprisingly, from Charleston and 
London. At the heart of the Industrial Revolution, Great Britain’s colonies had adequate 
capital at low rates available, which helped finance indigo production in South Carolina.
387
 
Credit was relatively easily obtained as Charleston merchants offered reasonable rates for 
planters seeking to purchase slaves or open new land and McCreery explains that: “By mid-
century Charleston was overpopulated with merchants ready to make long-term loans at 8 
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percent against land or crops and at only slightly higher rates for current accounts.”388 The 
line between merchant and large-scale planter also became somewhat blurred, as plantation 
enterprise served as a good investment. With few other alternatives for investments that could 
match the promise and security of planting, many merchants segued from trading into land 
and slave ownership.
389
  
 
The South Carolina indigo production was predominantly marked by a class of merchant 
planters of British or Huguenot origin with strong ties to England. Producing multiple 
commodities on a commercial scale in the framework of their plantations, with rice being the 
predominant crop, they participated in the Carolina eighteenth-century indigo boom.
390
 
Investment required in an indigo plantation was represented by relatively simple processing 
equipment and the purchase of slaves and with growers relying heavily on forced labour, the 
capital invested in indigo did not have to make the average rate of profit.
391
 While the 
merchant planters therefore provided the capital input for the South Carolina indigo 
plantation, residence was usually taken up in urban townhouses in the city, from which they 
became distant managers of far-flung settlements.
392
 An example provides Ralph Izard, who 
invested ₤ 5,000 into an indigo plantation and slaves to cultivate it. Izard’s 1777 tax return 
recorded that he owned 8,070 acres of land and 508 slaves, while still possessing thousands of 
pounds for which he could find no better use than to lend out at interest. He directed six other 
plantations from his elegantly furnished townhouse.
393
 Edelson writes that the ownership of 
multiple tracts of land was very common in late seventeenth century South Carolina, but by 
the later decades of the eighteenth century, the scale of these multiple plantation enterprises, 
and the distance of their component parts from one another, had drastically increased.
394
 
Favourable inheritances, wealth-concentrating marriages, and strong commodity earnings 
fuelled the enlargement of late colonial estates into multiple units of production.
395
 As 
merchant planter such as Ralph Izard managed their businesses from the comfort of 
Charleston, “[…] the liveliest, pleasantest, and the politest place, as it is one of the richest too 
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in all America”,396 they took refuge in their distance from the everyday struggle for authority 
on their plantations and isolated themselves from the violence slave labour.
397
     
 
It has become clear that the labour input within the plantation segment of the commodity 
chain was to a large extend met through the importation of slaves from Africa and the West 
Indies. The frontier, in which indigo was planted and processed, thus became a world of 
productive slave labour camps.
398
 Like with land, the labour required for indigo production 
complemented rather than competed with the already existing structures of the economy of 
South Carolina. Dye production generally required workers at different times of the year than 
did rice; the same worker could therefore be used for both products, employing the slaves for 
more profitable work more of the time.
399
 Edelson explains that the introduction of indigo had 
dire consequences for the slaves working in the South Carolina frontier zones, as it provided 
planters with opportunities to increase returns per labourer through filling up the gaps in the 
productive calendar with more work, time that slaves had usually used to produce their own 
crops.
400
 As a new crop for South Carolina slaves, indigo lacked a work history and thus fell 
outside the customary labour arrangements and from the moment the slaves began harvesting 
the plants, indigo production demanded the sunrise to sunset commitment of slave labour.
401
 
Yet, while indigo cultivation enforced more intensive labour on the field, the skilled tasks of 
indigo processing allowed masters to reward favoured slaves with better condition without 
freeing them.
402
 These indigo makers therefore joined slave drivers as part of a small class of 
enslaved managers. Planters hereby held hired and enslaved indigo makers accountable for 
the final product, who in turn took extraordinary care with each step of the process, imposing 
a rigid work discipline and inflexible standards on the workers.
403
   
 
Indigo had exact processing requirements, which represent the last input of the plantation 
segment in the indigo chain: the technological knowledge. McCreery explains that indigo 
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production is marked by a relative uniformity of the processing technology over time and 
between producing regions, and the manner of converting leaves and stems into indigo cakes 
had hardly changed after 1550. This is largely due to the communication between and about 
commodity chains, despite apparent national competition.
404
 In fact, Eliza Lucas Pinckney’s 
experiments with indigo in the 1740s were assisted by professional dye makers who were sent 
to her help by her father, although she suspected the first, Nicolas Cromwell from 
Monteserrat, to mystify the process and to spoil the colour of the dye in order to sabotage the 
success of South Carolina indigo.
405
 By mid-eighteenth century however, certain features of 
indigo cultivation and processing had been worked out empirically and had become standard 
in the colony.
406
 Indican, a colourless water-soluble glycoside, existed in the leaves, which 
underwent fermentation and oxidation processes in order to form the dye.
407
 After the men 
harvested the plant, the leaves were tied into bundles and transported to the processing plant 
where they were placed in a vat and covered in water. Leaving the bundles in the water for 
approximately twenty four hours, the workers drained the liquid off to the second vat and 
discarded the leaves. There, the liquid was agitated by wooden paddles to precipitate out the 
indigo granules, and sometimes limewater was added in order to speed up separation. The 
supervisor was responsible for the drawing off the water at precisely the right moment, which 
represented a crucial stage in the production of the dye. Afterwards, the indigo was packed 
into cloth bags, squeezed and hung up to dry. When most of the moisture was removed, 
workers cut the dye into small cakes for the retail market.
408
 The illustration below shows a 
‘Representation of the Machine used in making Indigo’ as it was published in the May and 
June issues of ‘The Gentleman’s Magazine’ in 1755, along with detailed information on the 
“culture and manufacturing” of indigo, including an itemization of the expenses involved.409 
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McCreery explains that the uniformity of this process over time and the rigid processing 
standards were to a large extend defined by a specific demand in the world market which 
determined that the product had to meet certain standards of size, finish and quality in order to 
become a commodity. The absence of modern chemical tests meant that purchasers of indigo 
expected a certain colour, consistency and finish, in order to evaluate the dye. If the product 
failed to meet expected standards, it could only be sold at a greatly reduced price and resulted 
in a bad reputation that was persistently hard to shake. This led the producers to imitate what 
has been established as popular indigo ‘brand’ in the world market.410 In fact, indigo from 
South Carolina struggled with what its planters perceived as an unfairly bad reputation. 
Edelson writes that: “Although the most proficient Carolina makers met the London market’s 
standards for symmetrical shape and luminous colour, their dye never sold as well as what 
planters from Guatemala or St. Domingue managed to ship every year.”411 Colonists therefore 
suspected that indigo’s reputation, good or bad, reflected the machinations of metropolitan 
merchants more than any stable use-value for colouring cloth.
412
 Some planters bridged the 
difference between regional reputation and reality by masking indigo’s origin as being 
French.
413
 Henry Laurens, a Carolina merchant planter who travelled to London in 1772 to 
present his own batch of the dye, wrote that:  
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I produced a sample of my indigo to some of the Wise men call’d Brokers and Dyers. They admired it much for 
East Florida Indigo. One said it was worth 12 or 14/ per lb., and was very sorry we could not make such indigo 
in Carolina. This proves the Strength of their Prejudices more than the Clearness of their Judgement […] I 
replied that I believed he was perfectly right, but to the Misfortune of the Owners of the Carolina Indigo, they 
could perceive a difference of 2 or 3 Shillings per lb. in the price, although the same indigo was sent and sold at 
Petersburgh for French. The Gentleman having no ready Reply, changed the subject. I hope we shall get to the 
bottom of this Mystery in time & remove the Evil.
414
  
 
This apparent unfairness of reputation caused grief among the patriotic Britons of America 
and after independence merchant planters such as Henry Laurens abandoned the British 
market for the French.
415
 The reputation of poor quality and low prices also indicates an 
unfavourable characterisation of the Carolina plantation society as a crude place, which was 
further reinforced by rumours that South Carolina planters adulterated their indigo with dirt to 
increase its weight.
416
 For a society that strived to “resemble old-England”,417 with its 
colonists staking claims to gentility, this represented a serious blow for the planters self-
image.
418
  
 
The production of indigo has been explained through the plantation ‘node’ of the commodity 
chain and its required inputs of land, capital, labour and suitable technological knowledge. 
After its production, the dye was transported to Charleston, the commercial hub of South 
Carolina, which was surrounded by a densely populated core plantation zone. The 
Lowcountry’s core zone was marked by a very traversable, interconnected landscape, 
interspersed with navigable rivers.
419
 Observing its riverine traffic, Charles Dickens, albeit in 
the nineteenth century, linked the Carolina capital to an American Venice.
420
 Sailing or 
rowing through the rivers, slaves transported goods to the market of Charleston at relatively 
low cost.
421
 The plantations outside the core zone had to be connected to the city by human 
labour. Slaves cleared a direct route by cutting channels through the maze of creeks and 
building traversable wagon roads and bridges in order to reach navigable water routes from 
which goods were transported to Charleston by schooner.
422
 By mid-eighteenth century, even 
the most remote plantations covering huge areas on the northern and southern coasts were 
connected to Charleston. In place of the small craft that shuttled goods between town and the 
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countryside in the core, 100 ton ships, capable of carrying 100 barrels or more, transported 
indigo to Charleston and left behind imported supplies.
423
 The remoteness of such plantations 
does not imply that they represent isolated domains detached from lager society. Instead, 
colonists viewed every part of the expanding landscape of the frontier in terms of connection 
to town, measuring space in relation to “distance from Charleston”.424  
 
With planters and slaves living on opposite ends of the Lowcountry,
425
 Charleston marked a 
space for “civility and refinement”, a stalk contrast to the crude world of productivity in the 
frontier.
426
 Representing the forth largest port in the thirteen colonies and extending to vital 
ports in the West Indies and along the Atlantic Ocean, Charleston (or Charles Town before 
August 13
th
 1783) was a town of staggering wealth, generated largely by the trade with 
African slaves and, as has been explained, its two chief commodities rice and indigo.
427
 
According to one estimate, the estates of Charleston merchants were valued as six times that 
of their Philadelphia contemporaries.
428
 Despite its metropolitan character however, it remains 
important to keep a sense of proportion. Colonial American cities could not be compared with 
their European counterparts: on the eve of independence, Charleston contained approximately 
12,000 people,
429
 encompassing just over 300 acre, which was the size of a modest plantation 
tract.
430
 In the late eighteenth century, approximately 230 mercantile firms traded here and the 
interests of some 2000 planters were represented by about 40 ‘country’ factors, hired to sell 
plantation produce in town.
431
 While it was thus a relatively large city by early modern 
standards, Charleston was characterised by a very intimate setting, where goods changed 
hands in physical face-to-face encounters and the town thus represents a physical rather than a 
metaphorical marketplace.
432
  
 
By the mid-eighteenth century, Charleston comprised a large native born elite with strong ties 
to England, which joined together wealthy merchants and planters to rule the colony from 
town as what Edelson calls a ‘rural-urban squirearchy’, dominating the ranks of Commons 
                                                 
423
 Ibid. p.134 
424
 Ibid. p.136 
425
 Ibid. p.201 
426
 Ibid. p.136 
427
 Ryan, William R. The World of Thomas Jeremiah. Charles Town on the Eve of the American Revolution, p.9 
428
 Ibid. p.9 
429
 Ibid. p.10 
430
 Edelson, Max S. Plantation Enterprise in Colonial South Carolina, p.177 
431
 Ibid. p.177 
432
 Ryan, William R. The World of Thomas Jeremiah. Charles Town on the Eve of the American Revolution, p.10 
and Edelson, Max S. Plantation Enterprise in Colonial South Carolina, p.177 
  
- 74 - 
 
House of Assembly and cementing ties through intermarriage.
433
 Lord Adam Gordon, who 
visited Charleston during the winter of 1764-1765, describes the Charleston elite in the 
following terms:  
The inhabitants are courteous, polite and affable, the most hospitable and attractive to Strangers, of any I have 
yet seen in America, very clever in business and almost all of them, first and last, have made a trip to the 
Mother-Country. It is the fashion to Send home [England] all their children for education … It is in general 
believed, that they are more attached to the Mother-Country, than those Provinces which lie more to the 
Northward.
434
 
 
As plantation profits arose from moving goods and people across a divided landscape, the 
distance that separated planters from plantations helped the reconciliation of desires for 
gentility with a path of economic expansion that created vast slave labour camps.
435
 Edelson 
explains that: “the rising refinement of material life within the core insulated planters from the 
harsh realities of the frontiers, laying a foundation […] for the belief that the countryside was 
approaching British standards of what such a landscape should be.”436   
 
After indigo had been cultivated, harvested and processed by slaves in the frontier, and further 
transported to Charleston through the waterways of the Lowcountry, the annual contest over 
the value and quality of the commodity during the shipping season was to begin. Planter’s 
economic life shifted from production to exchange and from being masters, who commanded 
others on their plantations, to marginal participants in the Atlantic economy, which was 
subject to unseen market forces and under the influence of powerful metropolitan merchants 
and officials.
437
 However, producers and merchants both operated on the edge of a global 
market about which they had at best imperfect information and over which they had no 
control.
438
 The engagement in servicing the international economy required a large degree of 
finance and skill, while the coordination of markets across space, time and cultures was made 
difficult by the slow diffusion of commercial intelligence, competition of fellow merchants 
and enemy rivals, and the unpredictable occurrences of war.
439
 The time it took to cross the 
Atlantic, on average ten weeks to Britain and six to Carolina, meant that the valuing of 
                                                 
433
 Edelson, Max S. Plantation Enterprise in Colonial South Carolina, p.137 
434
 Burton, Milby E. Charleston Furniture. 1700 – 1800, p. 5  
435
 Edelson, Max S. Plantation Enterprise in Colonial South Carolina, p.164 
436
 Ibid. p.164 
437
 Ibid. p.177 
438
 McCreery, David Indigo Commodity Chains in the Spanish and British Empires, 1560-1860 in Topik, Steven, 
Marichal, Carlos, Frank, Zephyr (eds.) From Silver to Cocaine. Latin American Commodity Chains and the 
Building of the World Economy, 1500-2000, p.65 
439
 O’Brien, Patrick Inseparable Connections: Trade, Economy, Fiscal State and the Expansion of Empire, 1688 
1815 in Marshall, Peter James, Louis, William Roger (eds.) The Oxford History of the British Empire Vol.II. The 
18
th
 Century, p.60 
  
- 75 - 
 
commodities was open to a wide-ranging conjecture; neither planters nor merchants knew 
what indigo was really worth to consumers abroad as they battled over prices.
440
  
 
Virtually all indigo exports were shipped to London and the indigo trade was organised in 
somewhat different ways than that of rice.
441
 Indigo’s high value to bulk ratio and the 
resulting small freight costs, as well as its great variations in quality, provided an incentive 
encouraging the richer indigo planters to market their own crops in Britain. This was done 
largely through the commission system, in which planters marketed goods at their own accord 
and risk and shipped them to a British port where they were sold by English commission 
agents on the planters’ direction.442 Most of the smaller indigo planters consigned part of their 
crops to Britain via Charleston merchants, who acted as brokers for groups of small scale 
producers.
443
 Some planters also sold their indigo to Charleston merchants directly in town for 
an immediate return, fuelling the annual contest over the value and quality of the commodity 
that marked every shipping season.
444
 In general, the planters thereby gained the upper hand 
in most commercial exchanges and McCreery states that merchants failed utterly in attempts 
to control the South Carolina indigo trade.
445
 Planters used their command over supply to 
influence the local market.
446
 They often spread commercial disinformation to attract greater 
fleets of ships and thus keep down freight costs, or held back commodities until export 
merchants, who were pressed for time due to the induced cost of ships staying in the harbour 
of Charleston for a longer period of time, agreed to their prices.
447
 
 
The rise of commission system of trade marked an important change in the eighteenth century 
Atlantic economy: In 1700, English merchants conducted almost all of England’s transatlantic 
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trade on their own account and risk, employing colonial residents as their agents and factors. 
Nash states that throughout the eighteenth century: “The English merchants, mainly of 
London, ceased to be entrepreneurs who traded on their own accounts and risks and became 
agents who sold consignments of goods received from America on commission and in return 
paid bills of exchange and sent out cargoes of manufactured goods to colonial merchants and 
planters.“448 The importance of local Charleston merchants has been subject to dispute as it 
has often been assumed that South Carolina, like many other Southern slave-based plantation 
colonies and as opposed to the northern regions marked by large native born merchant 
families, was dominated by English merchants. Unfortunately, knowledge of the role of 
British merchants and capital in the South Carolina trade is rather limited. Yet, the view that 
indigenous merchant capitalism was largely absent from South Carolina is somewhat 
contrasting to the grandeur of Charleston, the only large city in the plantation South, whose 
rapid eighteenth century growth was based on the expansion of trade.
449
 Charleston can be 
viewed as a junction through which various commodity chains are channelled, forming an 
intertwined web of commerce, credit and capital.  Planters, locally based traders, or export 
merchants, London linked merchants and merchant planters bought and sold their 
commodities on the Charleston market, where products such as indigo were bulked and 
shipped to England in return for imported manufactured goods.
450
  
 
During shipping season, Charleston’s otherwise unified elite tried to reconcile their particular 
economic interest with claims that each served the common good of the province they ruled 
together.
451
 Charleston merchants, which can also be called export merchants, bought, sold 
and moved commodities within the Atlantic economy and thus were an integral part of 
various commodity chains. Charleston was also the most important slave market in the 
mainland colonies and nearly all of the elite slave factors belonged to the ranks of the 
Charleston merchants, the same traders who bought and sold rice, indigo and dry goods.
452
 
Charleston merchants also took up an increasingly prominent role through handling the dry 
goods import trade. Nash investigated the claims of British merchants of the pre-war South 
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Carolina debts in regard to the import trades and states that: „[…] the chief businesses of all 
the British mercantile houses for which evidence survives, including the great majority of the 
leading London firms trading with South Carolina, were to act as agents for Charleston 
merchants to whom they supplied dried goods on the latter’s account and risk.”453 British 
correspondents always supplied dry goods on credit to independent Charleston importers and, 
along with the credit made available by British merchants in the slave trade, this formed the 
core of the financial relations between Britain and South Carolina.
454
 Charleston merchants 
dealing with export commodities however, found it increasingly difficult to tap into English 
capital. They had to acquire rice and indigo with their own money, sometimes selling it on 
their own accounts, but more often shipping it to British merchants, who later reimbursed 
them their cost plus a commission.
455
 Charleston merchants thus had to draw on their own 
resources when striking deals with planters and their country factors. Additionally, they had 
to advance funds for heavy port charges for ships that entered Charleston and were given in 
their care by British merchants.
456
 This also led to the common practice of trading in 
partnerships, with the chief advantage conferred by partnerships being that it was easier to 
raise trading capital.
457
 Chiefly acting on behalf of British merchants, who in turn were 
owners of the ships and for whom they bought and shipped commodities, Charleston 
merchants reimbursed themselves by drawing bills of exchange to their merchant 
correspondents in England.
458
 
 
This outlines that local Charleston merchants had gained a degree of entrepreneurial 
independence in the import trades of slaves and dry goods, where British finance heavily 
supplemented their capital. In the export trades, where there was less British capital and high 
shipping costs, Charleston merchants acted mainly as commission agents for British 
merchants or indigo planters.
459
 While Charleston merchants were not short of capital, the 
shortage of English credit as compared to that provided in the import trades, led to a great 
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portion of Charleston merchants investing in their own plantations. This fuelled the 
development of a class of merchant planters who planted indigo on a large scale and thus, as 
has been explained, often represented the capital input at the plantation node. Nash explains 
that: “[…] the lure of investment into the region’s slave plantation economy proved a much 
stronger attraction than the impulse to concentrate their resources in the foreign trade 
sector.“460 The early eighteenth century gave rise to the first generation of true overseas 
merchants, the majority of whom invested in land and slaves. This trend continuously 
intensified and the merchants of the second and third generation, who organized Charleston’s 
trade in the period up to the Revolution, usually combined trade with planting.
461
 Edgar and 
Bailey’s Directory of South Carolina House of Representatives of the period from 1692 to 
1775, shows that 80% of merchants owned plantations.
462
 In the late 1740s and 1750s, indigo 
was hereby a popular investment with a number of leading Charleston traders acquiring 
indigo estates in the southern Beaufort districts of South Carolina, one of the fastest-growing 
sectors of the plantation economy in the frontier of that era.
463
  
 
It should be emphasised that in general merchants became planters rather than the other way 
around. Migrants from Britain such as George Austin, Benjamin Godin and John McQueen or 
native born South Carolinians such as Henry Laurens, Gabriel Manigault and John Gueard, all 
established themselves as leading export merchants before becoming large scale planters.
464
 
Successful Charleston merchants in the colonial period tended to take one of two routes in 
their later careers: either they moved to Britain and became merchants or landowners, like 
George Austin, Henry Laurens's partner, who in 1762 retired to his native Shropshire, or, like 
Laurens himself, they remained in Carolina and became landowners and planters.
465
 For a 
former merchant like Henry Laurens, who had planned another 13,200-acre indigo plantation 
before the start American Revolution, dye making provided a highly profitably, though 
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speculative, investment for his time and money.
466
 Of the 119 merchant planters who served 
in the House of Representatives 96 (81%) were merchants before they were planters while 
only 13 (11%) were planters before they were merchants, with 10 (8%) apparently entered 
trade and planting concurrently.
467
 Merchants also made substantial indirect investments in 
agriculture by lending money to planters on mortgage.
468
 Planters also at times contributed to 
the financing of trade through passive investments in merchant-led trading ventures or ship 
owning groups or through lending money to merchants. Yet, it was much more common for 
planters to be indebted to merchants and merchants to lend money to each other within the 
commercial community, rather than outside of it.
469
 This outlines that it was trade that lent 
assistance to planting rather than planting that financed trade,
470
 a strong indication for the 
value creation of trade in the indigo commodity chain, which was channelled back into the 
plantation economy.  
 
The diversification into indigo planting was not a symptom of entrepreneurial backwardness, 
but a rational investment into a booming and profitable agricultural sector. Steffen emphasises 
however, that southern merchants also invested in land and slaves for non-economic reasons, 
but in order to enhance their claims to gentility and patriarchal authority. Many elite 
merchants hereby saw trade not as an end in itself but as an opportunity to secure a privileged 
place in landed society.
471
 South Carolina’s elite made a bit for recognition as an American 
gentry class and harboured what Edison called “a profound craving for metropolitan 
acceptance and approval”.472 While colonists claimed that they were turning savage Indian 
land into a civil European one, South Carolina’s image in Britain became increasingly that of 
an agricultural society, marked by an alien subtropical climate and built on slave labour.
473
 
Only through a cathartic break which came with the War of Independence, could former 
colonists start creating an identity that distinguished them from that of an idealized Britain.
474
 
More importantly, the American Revolution also marked the end of South Carolina’s indigo 
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trade as it destroyed the dye industry in North America.
475
 During the indigo boom South 
Carolinian merchant planters had made intensive use of land, labour and capital, through the 
cultivation of indigo and in return they realized great profits but in 1775 the Continental 
Congress prohibited any further exports to England and after 1783 the American states no 
longer had the protected British market. Mercantilism thus turned against the South 
Carolinians after 1783, when they found themselves outside the British Empire and subject to 
tax penalties and imperial preferences that ruined the industry.
476
 England turned to India and 
the East Indies for its indigo where planters started making the best dyes in the world. 
American planters then not only had to compete with the French and the Spanish indigo 
producers, but the East Indian planters as well.
477
 
 
III. b. The Indigo Commodity Chain: Bengal 1775 - 1850 
 
The American Revolution of the 1770s meant that the British lost control over American 
indigo supplies.
478
 By the early nineteenth century, Bengal was to become prominent in the 
global history of the commodity.
479
 The English East India Company (EIC) had established 
control over Bengal through its victory at the battle of Plassey in 1757.
480
 Already by the 
second half of the seventeenth century, the EIC had moved from purely commercial activities 
to become a colonial proprietor, governing a small but growing network of plantations in Asia 
and the South Atlantic.
481
 The battle of Plassey and the following take-over of Bengal 
however, marked the beginning of a slow and discontinuous acquisition of India.
482
 After 
1757 the EIC in India had evolved into an agency of government, supported by the British 
state, and its resulting tasks of conquest, governance and revenue extraction superseded the 
company’s original commercial mission.483 Although its trade monopoly with India remained 
in place until 1813, the EIC essentially became a medium through which to repatriate Indian 
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revenues for the benefit of British stockholders, rather than as a source of profit in itself.
484
 
The British rule over Bengal was thus carried out by a joint-stock company with a trading 
monopoly which entrusted its servants with semi-sovereign rights abroad.
485
  
 
Around 1780's, along with the British dominance in Bengal, the EIC was eager to develop a 
regular means of remittance to transfer its wealth and pay for imports.
486
 While profiting from 
trade with the subcontinent and with China, the company, and indeed all of Europe, suffered a 
constant specie drain to China and consequent liquidity problems.
487
 Since manufactured 
goods from India faced resistance from British manufacturers, only a primary commodity 
could be exported.
488
 Indigo, with its high value per weight and size, offered better 
speculative possibilities than bills of exchange and served as a practical vehicle that could be 
purchased in India and readily sold in London, thus allowing the company to send profits 
back to Europe.
489
 As has been explained, indigo was not new to India but had been an export 
product from ancient times when it was traded via the silk routes.
490
 The blue dye was 
cultivated and processed primarily in Gujarat, Rajasthan, Lahore, Oudh and Agra where it 
was consumed domestically and exported to the Roman Empire and Europe.
491
 The colonial 
production of indigo in the American tropics however had interrupted this long established 
connection.
492
 The enormity of indigo supply from plantations in West Indies and in southern 
parts of North America, which was distinctive in lower price and superior quality, had 
reduced India’s export significantly.493  
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Beginning in the 1770s the EIC sought to revive indigo production, but now in eastern India 
around the company’s stronghold of Calcutta.494 Bengal had no prior experience in the 
commercial production of the dye, yet it was to become the British textile industry’s main 
indigo supplier, as well as providing a much sought-after solution to remitting home revenue 
surplus.
495
 In 1786, the EIC’s Court of Directors, wrote to the Governor General of Bengal, 
with the following observation:  
 
When we reflect upon the cheapness of labour in Bengal, and the favourable climate it enjoys, we cannot 
harbour a doubt of the possibility of making indigo a most valuable article of importations; neither can we too 
strongly inculcate the necessity of your paying the most strict attention to it. We are confident that it might 
become one of the very best means of remittance to this country, and one of the least prejudicial exports from 
Bengal.
496
 
 
By 1800, sizable imports from Bengal started to reach the British market and in 1810 the 
authorities in Britain reported to Bengal that indigo “[…] appears to be established as a great 
staple of Bengal. It supplies much of the consumption of Europe, and no rival to it seems 
likely to arise.”497 The growth of the indigo industry in Bengal was impressive, growing from 
a few pioneers in 1780 to about 500 enterprises in 1830, with one enterprise sometimes 
owning several indigo factories. By then, these enterprises covered on average 1.000 ha each 
and the entire area under indigo cultivation was about 500.000 ha.
498
 Indigo was to massively 
transform the region of Bengal, leaving an in eradicable imprint on its social, economic and 
political nineteenth-century history.
499
 Britain on the other hand was to become the new 
dominant trader in the commodity.
500
 The promotion of indigo production on such a large 
scale and in an area that was practically new to the crop was substantially aided by a series of 
fiscal and monetary policies. For instance, in the early years the British protected the young 
indigo industry of Bengal against competition from established producers in North India, a 
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region which at that time had not yet been annexed to the British.
501
 The British planters in 
Bengal demanded a tariff protection on the grounds that indigo, being new in Bengal, 
necessitated larger investment and operating costs. Furthermore, they argued that the inferior 
quality from other indigo producing regions would destroy the reputation of Indian indigo in 
the world market.
502
  Support by the state and its subordinate the EIC was granted at almost 
every input in the indigo commodity chain of Bengal, and will thus become apparent through 
the description of each node within the chain. It enabled indigo from Bengal to acquire a 
competitive edge and thus become an arch-rival of the French and the Spanish indigo.
503
  
 
The first node of the indigo commodity chain in Bengal concerns itself with the production of 
indigo, including cultivation and processing and requiring inputs of land, labour, 
technological knowledge and capital. This structure of the chain is the same as has been seen 
in the case of South Carolina indigo. Whereas the South Carolina plantation and its slave 
labourers provided for both, the cultivation of the crop and the processing of the plant, the 
production of indigo in Bengal was however often subject to a more distinct divide between 
these two activities. In Bengal, indigo was processed in factories which were owned by 
European capitalists who entered into agreement with peasants to buy indigo leaves.
504
 Yet, 
harvested indigo had to be processed within a few hours, which meant that the indigo 
factories had to be located in close proximity of the indigo fields.
505
 Furthermore, while the 
indigo fields and factories were separate physical entities, they were not autonomous from 
each other, since without the one, the other simply would have ceased to exist. Cultivation 
and processing can thus still be regarded to be in the same segment of the commodity chain. 
The divide between factories and fields stemmed from the difficulties for European indigo 
producers to access land, which remained a continuous source of conflict leading to the ‘Blue 
Mutiny’ of the late 1850s, marking the end of indigo production in Bengal.506  
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The issues surrounding the access to land show the resilience of the Indian economy to 
European intrusion.
507
 While the Indian economy could in certain respects be subordinated to 
British purposes, especially in the earlier period it could not be restructured to provide 
openings for a wide range of British people.
508
 It is important to note that the British 
community in Bengal was not a settler community, acquiring land and sinking roots in India 
that went deeper with each generation, therefore acting as an agent of an extensive British 
economic and cultural penetration of India.
509
 The great majority of those who went to Bengal 
only spent a limited period in the country, during which they were employed by the state or its 
surrogate the East India Company.
510
 The indigo factories of Bengal can be considered the 
first large organizations in rural India which were not of military or religious nature.
511
 The 
British indigo system was hereby characterized by economies of scale, vertical integration, 
financial integration, market intelligence, and financial support from the government.
512
 It 
was dominated by large-scale organisations like R. Watson & Co. and Earskin & Co. who 
owned eight factories in Birbhum and six each in Burdwan and Bankura.
513
 Yet, the planter 
community in Bengal was relatively small, comprising just over 400 by 1861.
514
 Local 
Bengali entrepreneurs on the other hand belonged mainly to the small-scale sector but some 
exceptions did exist. An example provides Joy Chand Palchowdhuri, who set up 32 indigo 
factories in and around the district of Nadia.
515
 However, the share of local entrepreneurs 
constituted less than ten per cent of the total production and the indigo market was entirely 
European in its character. In most cases, indigo produced by local entrepreneurs received 
lower prices from European middlemen operating in Calcutta, regardless of its quality.
516
 
 
While indigo planters were almost exclusively of European decent, the crop was cultivated by 
local peasants called raiyats.
517
 Sah summarises that the legal relationship between planters 
and cultivators in Bengal were different across regions, and even within a region.
518
 The EIC 
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in Bengal governed a vast area and its European staff was miniscule in comparison which 
posed a wide range of administrative challenges.
519
 In a bit to keep down local unrest, the 
company initially forbade the purchase or even direct leasing of land by Europeans.
520
 
Landownership vested with the local zamindars, who acted as intermediaries for the EIC.
521
 
This proposes another actor within the commodity chain whose cooperation was necessary for 
its successful functioning. McCreery describes zamindars as rent-collecting classes.
522
 It is 
important to note however, that they represented a diverse group ranging from enormous 
estate owners who possessed military capacity as well as judicial and administrative 
responsibilities, to landlords that operated on a much smaller scale.
523
 The agrarian hierarchy 
in Bengal was often complex, with several possible intermediates between the zamindar and 
the actual tiller of the soil.
524
 In this scenario two systems commonly used to access land for 
the production of indigo emerged: the planters could contract with peasants for growing the 
crop on lands to which the latter had tenant rights (called ryotari or peasant farming) or they 
could grow indigo themselves on estates that they leased from a zamindar, called nij or own 
farming.
525
  
 
In the ryotari or peasant framing system, the Indian peasant had rights to the land based on the 
payments of rents to the local zamindar.
526
 The plantation of indigo rather than other crops 
was thereby assured through a system of debt: to pay his rent and ensure access to land and 
survival the raiyat obtained cash advances from the indigo planters, which were to be repaid 
with indigo plants at the next harvest. This led to the majority of the rural population being 
indebted with such debt even being passed on through generations.
527
 The nij method, in 
which land was leased directly from the local zamindar, usually involved the eviction of 
peasants from their hereditary land which were then routinely forced to work as wage 
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labourers.
528
 The table below shows however that production was cheaper in the ryotary 
arrangement compared to nij cultivation.
529
 
 
530
 
 
Roy explains that the possession of land was not a primary concern to the European planters 
in India. The main commitment was the production of a commodity at lowest possible cost, 
and few planters wanted to become fully fledged landlords or farmers.
531
 The cost of 
production was however almost always lower in the ryotari system of debt as opposed to the 
nij system which required wage labour. This system of debt, often applied in combination 
with physical intimation, also allowed the planters to impose indigo on cultivators even when 
other crops such as rice would have proved to be more profitable for the peasants.
532
 Bose 
thus summarises that: “the key to the planters general preference for the raiyati [ryotary] 
variety of production process was that it rested on grossly unpaid or underpaid peasant family 
labour.“533    
 
This directly ties in with the labour input at the production node of the indigo commodity 
chain in Bengal. Cultivation of indigo generally continued to be on small plots worked by 
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family labour with no immediate European involvement in this workforce.
534
 In most cases, 
the planter did not care how the leaves were produced as long as the indebted raiyat delivered 
them in time.
535
 The planters also often resorted to coercion to impose indigo on cultivators 
and to keep them bound to the system as long as possible.
536
 The brutalities of the British 
indigo system were very much evident in its formative years and since the early nineteenth 
century resistance from cultivators was common.
537
 If legal privileges did not suffice, 
processors thus used physical force with an example being provided by a widow who begged 
for protection from ‘the violence of the indigo gentleman.’538 McCreery states that: “Not 
surprisingly, feelings ran high, and the tension eventually exploded in the ‘Blue Mutiny’ of 
the late 1850s.”539  It is worth pointing out that such a view has also been challenged. Roy 
argues that the use of coercion and the planter’s ability to manipulate the institutions of the 
state has been overstated.
540
 Clearly great power asymmetries in the planter-cultivator 
relationship existed. When the EIC decided to develop the indigo industry in Bengal, the 
choice of cropping pattern was taken away from cultivators on a widespread scale.
541
 Roy 
does however remind us, that landownership belonged to the zamindars and some of the 
tenants were organised and influential. As the indigo commission evidence shows, many of 
the planter’s adversaries were not poorer peasants, but peasants with privileged tenure.542  
 
While a closer examination of the ‘Blue Mutiny’ is beyond the scope of this paper, Roy’s 
reasoning once again underlines that India was not a settler colony, but rested on an 
established society with its own hierarchy in place. The indigo system, although clearly 
imposed and fostered by the EIC and the European planters, was subject to a variety of local 
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actors. The European indigo planters often worked in collaboration with parts of the Indian 
society that were “[…] better able to secure […] cultivation, from their immediate connexion 
with the cultivators.”543 McCreery acknowledges that labour was normally not directly 
coerced but that planters hired other agents through which a system of indirect coercion could 
be applied. While he refers to ‘hired thugs’ that made certain that indigo was available on 
time,
544
 Ray advocates this role to ‘orderly peons’ which preformed the job of supervision of 
the cultivators.
545
 Roy outlines that in areas that were rather new to indigo, planters ensured 
its cultivation through local ‘headmen’. In more established indigo regions, the headmen’s 
authority had however been appropriated by paid officers of the indigo factory which often 
came from upper castes and possessed a working knowledge of English but yet had strong ties 
to the local peasants. Often these officers possessed superior tendency rights to land but did 
not cultivate it themselves.
546
  Swamy also outlines that while zamindars represented the first 
tier in the agrarian hierarchy, other powerful actors which often had tenants of their own, 
existed on the village level.
547
 The indigo factory was also a source of direct employment for 
parts of the local population and a large number of Indians therefore participated in British 
plantations as subordinates employed in administration, production and policing activities.
548
 
The biggest section of factory workers was hereby represented by manufacturing workers.
549
 
Additionally, transport operators such as boat- and cart-men collected raw materials as well as 
transported the dye to Calcutta.
550
 While the employees at lower ranks usually received a 
fixed salary, higher ranked positions received a salary plus a commission on revenue.
551
 
 
The British indigo system was characterized by economies of scale, but cooperation from 
local landlords and help from the imperial administration was necessary for British planters to 
exercise power over the main inputs of production, namely, labour and land.
552
 The 
technology input in the plantation node of the indigo commodity chain in Bengal was marked 
through government support in even more direct ways: the British authorities sent samples of 
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the best Caribbean indigo dye for their emulation and wrote letters on how to process 
indigo.
553
 Bengal indigo faced initial difficulties in its aspirations to imitate the established 
‘brand’ of the global commodity since the dye was often shaped imperfectly in squares, 
containing white veins.
554
 The EIC provided detailed technical reports on the drawbacks of 
indigo from Bengal compared to others, as well as descriptions of remedial measures to 
overcome shortcomings.
555
 Additionally, experienced indigo planters from the Caribbean 
were encouraged to start indigo plantations in Bengal.
556
 Following the United States 
independence, the EIC also imported planters from the American South to bring the latest 
techniques back to India.
557
 The international migration of indigo entrepreneurs and managers 
enabled the transfer of knowledge and technology from the Americas to South 
Asia: immigrated indigo entrepreneurs introduced new models of organisation, labour 
discipline and management which had been developed in prominent indigo producing regions 
such as Haiti and were adapted to local conditions.
558
 Benefiting from eighteenth century 
forms of technology, processing thus underwent an almost identical procedure as has been 
described in regard to South Carolina.
 559
 This largely resulted from the communication 
between different indigo commodity chains, as well as the global standards of the commodity 
itself.
560
 While the indigo factories therefore operated through standardized European models 
marked by economies of scale, the cultivation of the crop was to a large extend based on 
small-scale family labour. The problems surrounding access to land resulted in the failure of 
capital to penetrate the countryside and restructure agriculture on the basis of capitalist 
rationality.
561
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The capital input at the indigo commodity chain in Bengal thus shows that in most cases 
commercial capital only indirectly penetrated the first levels of production, as in the 
cultivation of the crop, through a system of debt.
562
 European controlled indigo processing got 
its start with financing from the East India Company.
563
 The company ensured the availability 
of capital and money was advanced to Bengal planters on the security of indigo which 
provided planters with a source of a working capital loan without any charge of interest.
564
 
The policy was instrumental to the development of the industry by creating a strong base of 
private capital. In 1802 however the company effectively withdrew from the direct funding of 
indigo, preferring to buy the dye it needed through contracts or on the spot market. The Court 
of Directors observed that:  
[S]ufficient pecuniary encouragement has already been given to the merchants of your presidency concerned in 
the cultivation and manufacture of indigo, and [...] from the large profit that has arisen from the produce of that 
commodity at the Company’s sales, the merchants may be able, from their own resources, to make the necessary 
advances for carrying it on 
565
 
 
From then on, capital was funnelled through ‘agency houses’, which led to their growing 
importance in the financing of the production of the dye.
566
 Agency houses engaged in a wide 
range of commercial activities, including banking, shipping, investment in commodity 
production, as well as agency work such as the handling of wills, trusts, the estates of clients, 
and the remittance of their wealth to England or elsewhere.
567
 Jones explains that private 
merchants, who had often served for the EIC and who retained close collaborative links with 
it, developed a large trade within Asia during the second half of the eighteenth century. These 
traders showed an early tendency to diversify out of trade and make investment in other 
activities. By the 1790s British agency houses in India thus began investing in indigo 
plantations, often persuading others to invest in their ventures but retaining management of 
them.
568
 At this time, fifteen agency houses operated out of Calcutta, the centre of Bengal’s 
commercial activity, rising to twenty nine in 1803, a number that fluctuated over time but 
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certainly further increased following the opening of trade between Britain and India in 
1813.
569
 
 
The importance of agency houses was also fuelled by a series of financial crises of the EIC in 
the 1770s and 1780s. While the British government came to rescue the EIC, it tightened its 
control over the company, resulting in the Cornwallis reforms in the late 1780s. In a bit to 
improve governance and reduce corruption in the Company’s bureaucracy, Charles 
Cornwallis was appointed new Governor-General and sent to Calcutta in 1786.
570
 His reforms 
included the raise of EIC employees’ salaries but at the same time they were banned from 
engaging in private commercial activity.
571
 On the one hand this eliminated competition of 
privileged EIC servants, on the other hand company servants now needed new opportunities 
to invest their boosted funds and repatriate their savings.
572
 Operating through ‘sister’ houses 
in London, agency houses represented the best possible outlet, as they provided banking 
facilities as well as agency services for their personal clients, offering attractive rates of 
interest on deposits and facilitating remittance to Britain through bills of exchange. The 
deposits of European savings in India thus furnished the firms with a vast pool of capital to 
finance indigo production.
573
 This type of banking, as a means to generate investing, together 
with the development of close commercial connections with the City of London, represents a 
distinctive form of European commercial organisation during that period.
574
 Most private 
entrepreneurs were therefore closely linked with the civil servants and officers of the EIC, 
acting as their bankers and borrowing from their savings to finance their own enterprises.
575
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Indigo in Bengal was prone to overproduction since the commodity was driven by remittances 
as much as market demand.
576
 Trading profits as well as the opportunity to get their clients’ 
wealth back to England attracted agency houses to invest in the commodity.
577
 Agency houses 
thus often overextend themselves when financing indigo production, leading to a major crisis 
in the early 1830s during which many of the agency houses collapsed.
578
 Due to the 
remoteness of most indigo factories, the agency houses also struggled to monitor their 
debtors, often leading to tardiness in the servicing and repayment of debts.
579
 Palmer and 
Company was among the first to default and Chaudhuri goes as far as describe the fall of the 
firm as the ‘signal’ for the general crisis in business confidence that followed, leading to the 
failure of almost all Calcutta houses by 1834.
580
 Several newly formed agency houses took 
over the financing of the crop, but many of them failed too during the crisis of 1847-1848.
581
 
Despite such instabilities, India grew steadily as a major exporter of indigo and most London 
corresponding houses were therefore eager to exert firmer control over enterprise in India.
582
 
As India ceased to be an exotic outpost and became more and more integrated into the 
mainstream imperial economy, English merchant houses settled their own factors and 
branches in Bengal,
583
 and by the 1850s London interests were firmly in charge.
584
 The major 
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share of the capital input in the indigo production node was therefore obtained at first through 
the EIC and later through agency houses based in Calcutta. Both types of institutions were, of 
course, strongly linked to the City of London, whose service sector increasingly tightened its 
control over Bengal trade.  
  
As outlined, the production of the dye was characterized through inputs of land, labour, 
technological knowledge and capital. The indigo factories were located in the interior and the 
commodity therefore had to be transported to Calcutta by local boat and cart-men.
585
 While 
such labour could be preformed much more cheaply by local Indians than their British 
counterparts, crucial positions in the management of India's overseas trade, whether it was 
handled by the Company as a trading body or by British mercantile concerns, remained to be 
reserved for Europeans.
586
 Calcutta rapidly expanded and became the hub of industry, trade 
and commerce, boosting a lively British community.
587
 It is worth noting that the British in 
India never conceived of themselves in any other terms, subscripting themselves as much as 
possible to a British life style.
588
 Even in the early periods, when their numbers were 
relatively few, or in far-flung areas were they lived in relative isolation, when 
communications with home were slow and when terms of uninterrupted service in India were 
very long indeed, the British still did not merge into India.
589
 Webster argues however that 
such a segregation from Indian culture continually increased in the course of the nineteenth 
century marked by growing efforts to create islands of “Britishness”.590 Marshall explains that 
Calcutta was hereby modelled against an ideal of civility, fuelling the foundation of societies 
to disseminate learning and improvement. Funds were generously subscribed for 
philanthropic purposes with committees elected to administer them, books were imported in 
large quantities leading to the set up of circulating libraries, printing was established and 
newspapers proliferated. Cultural ambitions ran high and social life revolved around field 
sports, riding, music performances and a cold weather season of balls, assemblies and 
theatricals. The theatres, race courts and assembly rooms provide testimony to the exceptional 
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wealth concentrated in Calcutta.
591
 The port city flourished through trade, but whatever trends 
it may have reflected from British metropolitan society, Anglo-India was essentially a 
military society built on Indian foundations. British people in India, regardless if military or 
civilian, could hardly ignore that they were part of an extrinsic regime dependent on its 
army.
592
  They lived in what has been dubbed a ‘company-state’.593 The EIC hereby even 
determined who could reside in the colony and what activities they might pursue.
594
  
 
When looking at the indigo trade centred in Calcutta, it comes as no surprise that the company 
played a central role. The EIC provided much of the initial capital for the European takeover 
of the commodity and controlled its transport to London.
595
 From the decision to develop 
indigo in Bengal, the company together with the English government, introduced various 
further policies to nurture its trade. As already mentioned, the British protected the young 
indigo industry of Bengal against competition from other established Indian regions through 
imposing a transit duty on their indigo passing through Calcutta.
596
 To promote the local 
industry’s development, a favourable trade contract was further awarded to Joseph Princep in 
1779 and six more such contracts followed until 1786.
597
 However, a letter from the Court of 
directors to the Governor-general in Council, Bengal, on the 28
th
 March 1788 states that: 
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Having taken a review of the issue of our concerns in the article of indigo, from the time of our Board of Trade 
entering into the first contract for that article with mister Prinsep, in the year 1779-80, up to the latest period, we 
are sorry to remark the very heavy losses that have constantly occurred thereon.
598
  
 
On average, such loss amounted to 27 per cent during 1779-85. For instance, in 1786 the 
company had invested £30,207 but got back only £21,596, that is, 28 per cent below the 
margin of cost.
599
 This also shows that despite all supportive measures and market incentives, 
the efforts of the company to establish Bengal as the new world centre for indigo production 
were marked by struggles.
600
 While the basic policy of exploiting a primary commodity 
through imperial powers remained the same, the EIC had to experiment with different 
methods, which resulted in policies that often displayed what Sah calls ‘a multilevel 
schizophrenia’ between protection and competition, as well as long-term aim and short-term 
expediency.
601
  In 1788 the Court of Directors stated that: 
From a due consideration of these circumstances, we see a necessity for adopting some other measures 
concerning this article, than those that have been heretofore pursued. […] We feel with reluctance, that an article 
which, considered in a political point of view, has every claim to our attention, as having a tendency to render 
the Company’s possession in Bengal more valuable, by creating from the soil and labour of the natives an export 
commerce, capable of being carried to a very great extend, as well as ultimately to benefit this country, in 
supplying an article so necessary to its manufactures, and for which large sums are annually paid to foreigners, 
should be wholly abandoned, after the very heavy expenses that have been incurred, in bringing it to the degree 
of perfection at which it is now arrived […]”602 
 
As had been explained in the technology input at the production node of the commodity 
chain, Bengal indigo suffered from initial drawbacks in quality and did not sufficiently 
replicate the most popular ‘brand’ of the global commodity. In a bit to increase its quality and 
thus receive higher prices for Bengal indigo, and after having endured large losses from the 
provision of favourable trade contracts, the EIC decided to privatise the market:  
We are led to the measure of laying open this branch of trade, in the hopes that it will create among individuals 
that kind of competition, which will not fail to operate in bringing the article to its greatest possible state of 
perfection, and as well as to ascertain the lowest rate at which it is possible to be manufactured : in addition to 
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which we conceive that it will afford the Company’s servants a legal, ample, and we hope advantageous mode of 
remitting their fortunes to Europe […].603 
  
Looking at these sources, it becomes clear that despite apparent problems and struggles, the 
company repeatedly underscored Britain’s political and economic interest in indigo.604 The 
commodity thus remained subject to favourable trade policies: in 1789, the export duty on 
Bengal indigo had been removed and its import duty in England was also reduced from five 
per cent to two and a half per cent in 1791, and was completely removed in 1793 for the 
following five years. Indigo continued to enjoy a preferential treatment until 1819. For 
instance, in 1803-4 the indigo import duty in England was 11 s. 8 25/40 d. per 100 pounds for 
East India, as against 14s. 3/4 d. for other British plantations, £1 17s. 6d. for the US and £2 
19s. 7d. for even others.
605
 The efforts paid off and once its quality had been ensured Bengal 
indigo captured the British market very fast. East India’s share in the British trade increased 
from only 10 per cent in 1785, to 25 per cent in 1790 and 50 per cent in 1794. By 1815, East 
India served more than 99 per cent of the British market, and while this trend had been 
accelerated through the Napoleonic wars from 1793 to 1814 which disrupted Britain’s 
conventional sources of the commodity, the increase in indigo trade from Bengal is 
nevertheless impressive: in volume, its intake by Great Britain rose from 0.15 million pounds 
in 1785 to 1.40 million pounds in 1794 and further to 7.25 million pounds in 1815.
606
 
 
Indigo in hand the planters or agency houses had several options. Often they were bound to 
the company by contract. A popular form of contract with planters was an advanced payment 
system which was introduced by the EIC in 1811. It envisaged that the government would pay 
an advance to the planters for indigo on the condition that they must sell it to the company at 
the ruling price in England.
607
 If they were not bound to the company by contract, they could 
sell on the spot market where they encountered not just company buyers but also agents 
representing, for example, U.S. and European interests.
608
 Planters or agency houses could 
also forward indigo directly to London, paying the company for shipping, and selling the dye 
there on their own account.
609
 The graph below shows the most important destinations for the 
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commodity, leaving Calcutta for 1805-6. London’s dominance in the Bengal indigo trade is 
hereby unquestioned.  
Direction of Indigo Trade from Calcutta Port 1805-6
London
Lisbon
America
Persia and Arabia
Malabar
610
 
 
The omnipresent role of the EIC in Bengal did of course not pass by the agency houses in 
Calcutta, which enjoyed an ambivalent relationship with ‘John Company’. The firms helped 
EIC to finance wars and trading activities by promoting the purchase of Indian government 
securities and their relations were further tightened since many of the company’s officials 
provided lucrative clients who entrusted their savings to the agency houses.
 611
 However, the 
company’s trade monopoly which remained in place until 1813 was a source of frustrations 
for the houses that sought access to the British domestic market and the EIC also at times 
competed with the houses for funds of Europeans in India.
612
 War and territorial expansion 
resulted in a need for the company to borrow heavily through the issue of government 
securities. In order to hold onto deposits, the agency houses therefore frequently had to offer 
higher rates of interests which contributed to bankruptcy and crisis.
613
 Ultimately however, 
the crisis of the 1830s and 1840s are symptoms of a structural speciality of the indigo trade 
from Bengal. What set the region apart from others was that the amount of indigo delivered to 
the markets depended not entirely on actual or anticipated demand or even on price, but on 
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the need for the company and private business in Bengal to remit payments and profits to 
Europe.
614
 McCreery points out that: “It is not surprising, therefore, that the London market 
for indigo underwent violent and wholly unpredictable swings, stimulating speculation and 
leaving a waste of bankruptcies in their wake.”615 
  
Despite such episodes of great financing mishaps encountered by individual planters and 
agency houses, the indigo trade grew steadily and Britain had adequate capital available for 
its finance.
616
 However, the failure of capital to penetrate the countryside and the increasing 
resistance of cultivators, leading to break out of violence in the ‘Blue Mutiny’ of the late 
1850s, started to seriously threaten the British order in Bengal. As a result, at the end of 1860 
the company proclaimed that growing of indigo could not be imposed against the will of the 
cultivators anymore.
617
 Yet, the British administration had taken care to ensure that the indigo 
system in other Indian regions remained insulated from the events in Bengal.
618
 Shortly 
thereafter, the indigo industry in Bengal was shifted to the neighbouring states of Bihar and 
the United Province.
619
 
 
III. c. Comparative Analysis: Empire, Services and Gentlemen in the Indigo Commodity 
Chains 
 
The two case studies provided are very different indeed. They function under different 
socioeconomic and geopolitical conditions, are set in different timeframes and operate on 
opposite sides of the globe, converging only at the commodities’ destination in London. Yet, 
the outline of the factors of production and trade with the commodity allows for comparative 
analysis. The two tables below graphically illustrate the two indigo commodity chains as they 
have been outlined in part III. a and III. b. 
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Cain and Hopkins urge us to view imperialism as a process transmitting impulses from a 
particular source of energy; a definition which is open enough to encompass different types of 
domination and doesn’t confine itself to a specific historical stage.620 The expansion of 
Empire was hereby driven by the search for revenue to bolster trading profits, which 
increasingly financed the British military fiscal state, leading to a convergence of political 
power and the wealth of the service sector into what Cain and Hopkins described as 
                                                 
620
 Cain, P.J., Hopkins, A.G. British Imperialism. 1688-2000, p.55 
  
- 100 - 
 
gentlemanly capitalism.
621
 Indigo thus acts as a reference point; it provides guidance though 
different world regions, imperial systems and timeframes. The commodity was highly sought 
after by the expanding British textile industry and its demand was thus greatly fuelled through 
industrialisation. The dyestuff therefore provides an excellent means to test Cain and Hopkins 
argument of gentlemanly capitalism. Looking at the governance structure of the indigo 
commodity chains, allows for an analysis of the driving ‘agents’ within those two different 
parts of the British Empire. Views that the British Empire was driven by the need to provide 
raw materials to an industrialising Britain, therefore representing mainly industrial interests, 
can hereby be questioned. In short, the comparative analysis of the two indigo commodity 
chains allows us to explore Cain and Hopkins’s account of British imperialism against 
specific, yet different, case studies. Such a comparison also sheds light on the broader 
political, economic and social environments in which these chains operate and serves to 
outline the institutional and systemic factors that shape the chains.
 
 
 
This is in line with Bair’s appeal to study the factors that can be called ‘external’ to 
commodity chains more closely, stating that:  
The next generation of commodity chain research should focus on complementing the strengths of the chain 
framework as an approach that allows us to conceptualize and study global capitalism as it is manifest in 
particular inter-firm networks that link economic actors across space. […] what we need to study more closely 
are the factors external to chains that shape their geography and configuration, and strongly affect the extend to 
which different actors benefit from participating in them.
622
 
 
This terminology can be misleading, as ‘external’ factors are hereby considered very 
constitutive of commodity chains and are often as critical to their development as ‘internal’ 
ones. The term does however provide a differentiation from those ‘internal’ factors that 
describe characteristics of production and transaction processes and therefore outline the ways 
in which these produce particular governance structures.
623
 It will become clear that both, 
‘internal’ and ‘external’, variables have the capacity to significantly influence the governance 
structure of a commodity chain. Humphrey and Schmitz definition of governance allows 
room for both such variables stating that “the concept is used to refer to the inter-firm and 
institutional mechanism through which non-market co-ordination of activities take place. This 
coordination is achieved through the setting and enforcement of product and process 
parameters to be met by actors in the chain.”624 While the governance of the indigo 
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commodity chain is central to its ‘internal’ structure, they thus acknowledge that institutional 
mechanism also represent critical components of governance, further underlining that the 
distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ factors within commodity chains is, of course, 
not a linear one.
625
 
 
Looking at the governance structure of the Bengal and South Carolina indigo commodity 
chains raises important questions about the relationship between the different actors within 
these chains. Governance hereby explores which actors are most able to assert control over 
various aspects of the production and transaction processes, and will thus give insights into 
the value creation and its distribution along the chain.
626
 The governance structure therefore 
allows for an analysis of the value of services, considering the interconnected interests of 
producers, merchants and investors. Looking at Cain and Hopkins’s concept of gentlemanly 
capitalism, the measurement of value in terms of numerical profits, which is further 
complicated by an absence of a complete and reliable set of numbers, is however not a 
priority. What we need to establish is whether it was industry, services, or both, that drove 
imperial expansion and fuelled the production of indigo in South Carolina and Bengal. Where 
did Cain and Hopkins’s gentlemen operate within these chains and how much control were 
they are able to assert over production processes? In order to answer these questions, I will 
look at governance through an analysis of competition and barriers of entry. The influence of 
institutions, the British Empire and imperial competition, the system of mercantilism and the 
British military fiscal state, are hereby considered.  
 
It has become apparent in both case studies that indigo was very much subject to global 
standards. New entrants into the market, whether in South Carolina or Bengal, attempted to 
imitate what was considered an established popular ‘brand’ in Europe as closely as 
possible.
627
 Within both indigo commodity chains, buyers rather than producers therefore 
played an important role in setting product parameters. They did so because of the (perceived) 
risk of producer failure.
628
 The time and space which separated importers in London from 
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areas of production made it impossible to assess the quality of a product with any certainty 
until long after orders had been issued. Commodity reputation therefore was of central 
importance.
629
 Imposed regional reputations on imported commodities allowed merchants to 
predict the quality and thus the expected market price that unseen commodities may 
command.
630
 Indigo in hand, buyers judged its quality by colour, consistency and finish and 
by defining what was acceptable as a commodity, buyers largely determined how processing 
must occur, resulting in a relative uniformity of production worldwide.
631
 This shows that the 
expectations of London buyers operating in the service sector exerted a substantial influence 
over production processes in both indigo commodity chains. Rabach summarised that service 
activities have the capabilities to interconnect production processes of commodity chains in at 
least five interrelated ways (1) what is produced, which she refers to as product conception 
and design‚ (2) how it is produced, influencing the organisation of production and the choice 
of technology (3) spatial coordination such as transportation and flow of information (4) other 
“facilitating services” such as banking and provision of financial capital and (5) 
distribution.
632
 The fact that demand of certain attributes and quality standards of a 
commodity influences production, does however not suffice in explaining governance 
structures, but plainly describes market preferences. Clearly governance has something to do 
with exercising control along the chain and the key parameters which define such control over 
production processes can be summarised in terms of asserting direct influence over what is 
produced and how it is produced; additionally, when and how much is to be produced can be 
subject to control and one might add a fifth parameter, price.
633
  
 
In order to asses the governance structure of the indigo production in South Carolina and 
Bengal, it is necessary to look at both chains individually in terms of control over these key 
parameters. Once the EIC had established control over Bengal, it controlled all European 
enterprise within the region. As has been explained, Bengal had no prior experience with 
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indigo and its introduction in the area was a conscious decision by the company, which 
thereafter nourished cultivation, processing and trade of the crop. In the beginning ‘John 
Company’ unquestionably decided on what, how, how much, when, and one might even add 
‘by whom’, indigo was produced in Bengal and it went to considerable lengths to see through 
these decision until indigo had become a profitable export commodity of the region. While 
the EIC did not directly employ planters and exclusively carried out the trade of the 
commodity, it influenced every step of its production.
634
 Yet, the imposition of indigo also 
faced serious opposition and the power and control of indigo production processes was a 
times challenged. The EIC had to delicately negotiate between the interests of planters, which 
produced the desired commodity, while at the same time avoiding local unrest.
635
 The 
inability to fully exert control over land and its cultivators required the cooperation of local 
actors such as zamindars, which were integrated into the system as rent-collecting classes.
636
 
This is in line with Cain and Hopkins account, outlining that the EIC identified 
representatives of indigenous gentry in India who would in turn police the land for the 
company’s purposes. The EIC therefore exported British notions of property rights to India, 
looked to agriculture to generate rents and integrated or created local elites which became 
subordinate to the company’s central authority.637   
 
In regard to indigo production, the company specified precisely how particular standards 
should be attained by requiring and helping to introduce certain production processes. When 
this is the case, chain literature refers to the buyer as the ‘lead firm’. 638 Although this 
terminology is mostly used within contemporary commodity chains, it certainly applies to the 
role of the EIC in the indigo commodity chain. In many ways, the company can be viewed as 
the prototype for the multinational co-operations which were to develop in the twentieth 
century: despite its mercantilist monopoly, it also represented a capitalist enterprise that 
generated as well as recycled wealth and produced and integrated income streams from 
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different countries.
639
 Over time, the company withdrew from financing indigo and privatised 
the market, but it had created and continued to maintain the legal-political structure within 
which production and trade operated.
640
 Yet, the increasing conflict with the local peasants 
represented a serious threat to governance capabilities and by the late 1850s this finally led to 
a breakdown of the indigo commodity chain.
641
 
 
In South Carolina, the governance structure is less evident and it is not possible to identify a 
‘lead firm’ as such. South Carolina planters established indigo production themselves and, 
albeit receiving substantial support from Britain, they remained in control of the production 
processes, deciding over what, how, when and how much is to be produced. Additionally, 
planters often gained the upper hand in commercial exchanges and merchants failed to control 
the South Carolina indigo trade.
642
 Indigo production became such a profitable investment, 
that many established merchants preferred to diversify into planting, choosing to act as 
commission agents for London merchants in the export trades.
643
 The line between planter 
and merchant became blurred, representing a more or less coherent elite that established itself 
in Charleston. Different interests only became apparent during shipping season, when the 
annual contest over the value and quality of commodities was to begin.
644
 Price could be 
manipulated by planters through the circulation of disinformation regarding the estimated size 
of crops in order to fool import merchants in Britain into dispatching large fleets and therefore 
driving down freight costs.
645
 It is thus impossible to identify a clear governance structure in 
the South Carolina indigo commodity chain. Yet, all powerful actors involved fall in line with 
Cain and Hopkins description of gentlemanly capitalists. The alliance between the wealth of 
the service sector with the power of landed elites was exported to the New World, where it is 
illustrated through the desire of the gentlemanly diaspora to acquire land as an investment, as 
well as in order to enhance their claims to gentility and patriarchal authority.
646
 While 
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planting created a distinctive new occupation and social category in America, it was also a 
British enterprise created to extend British culture and society into newly colonized places.
647
  
 
Cain and Hopkins remind us that the landed aristocracy represented the dominant force in 
Britain until well into the nineteenth century and they outline that: “The more a career or a 
source of income allowed for a lifestyle similar to that of the landed class, the higher the 
prestige it carried and the greater the power it conferred.”648 Gentlemen therefore distanced 
themselves from the mundane world of producing commodities, following the higher calling 
of directing others and accumulating wealth in ways that were consistent with the 
gentlemanly lifestyle defined by the aristocracy.
649
 Like British gentlemen, their South 
Carolina counterparts aimed to take refuge in the distance and civility of Charleston from the 
crude world of production on their plantations.
650
 Additionally, they sought to live up to a 
gentlemanly ideal marked by a code of honour.
651
 During shipping season all agents involved 
struggled to align economic interests with the claims that they each served the common good 
of the province and the mother country, and thus placed duty before self advancement.
 652
 
 
Services and production can not be easily separated in the South Carolina indigo commodity 
chain. Powerful agents within the chain however formed a gentlemanly diaspora which forged 
the link between the colony and England. While there is no clear governance structure, 
control still rested with what Cain and Hopkins called gentlemanly capitalist, reproducing the 
alliance of landed power with the wealth of the service sector abroad. The difference in the 
two commodity chains lies in the fact that in North America they ran into young states that 
were being built up, whereas in India they were entangled with an ancient Empire that was 
breaking down.
653
 In Bengal, capital failed to penetrate the countryside and the EIC and 
agency houses became the vehicle through which gentlemen operated. While agency houses 
invested in indigo processing factories too, often through the funds of EIC servants, the 
objective was not to acquire land but solemnly to increase funds and repatriate savings.
654
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Likewise, few indigo planters aspired to become fully fledged landlords. Even when they 
gained access to land, a system of peasant cultivation was generally preferred since it assured 
the production of indigo at the lowest possible cost.
655
 After having established patterns of 
governance in both chains, however different they may be, the question of why this 
governance is exercised and what this means for all actors involved remains to be discussed. 
For instance, it has been explained that the EIC efforts to establish indigo were initially 
marked by difficulties and even substantial financial losses.
656
 Humphrey and Schmitz remind 
us, that governance by the buyer, as in the setting and/or enforcing of parameters along the 
chain, can be a costly endeavour often requiring substantial investments.
657
 In short, this asks 
why does governance matter and what are its implication for the actors along the chain?  
 
As has been noted, governance can be exercised in different ways, and likewise, different 
parts of the same chain can be governed in different ways.
658
 A rather straightforward but 
never the less very important example provides the relationship of planters and cultivators in 
South Carolina. Planters clearly exerted governance over their slaves and were thus able to 
create surplus value through the labour input of the indigo commodity chain.
659
 In Bengal, 
where planters relied on the cooperation of local zamindars, the situation was more complex, 
but in many cases a system of debt served to ensure a certain degree of governance, albeit 
marked by difficulties. In both cases, the exploitation of labour thus ensured that in the 
planter/cultivator relationship the distribution of gains was clearly working in favour of 
planters. Yet, Kaplinsky suggests that the ability to govern large parts of the chain, rather than 
individual inputs, often rests in intangible competences which are characterized by high 
barriers of entry and command high returns. In very general terms, this means that economic 
activity that is subject to low barriers of entry is naturally exposed to higher levels of 
competition.
660
  It thus makes sense to investigate governance in regard to the barriers of entry 
along the commodity chains. When looking at the uneven distribution of gains in the process 
of globalisation, Magee and Thompson identify three conceptually distinct but practically 
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interrelated types of barriers.
661
 The first is of cultural, ethic or religious nature and regards an 
understanding of markets, including the different tastes, values, expectations and beliefs 
therein. The second type of barrier is informational and outlines that the flow and differing 
availability of information in different contexts can block, retard or even re-orientate the focus 
of integration. Optimal economic choices can only be made if adequate, accurate and relevant 
knowledge of available options exist. Finally, the third type of barrier is political, describing 
the way in which domestic and commercial policies and regulations place limits on economic 
activities.
662
 When investigating the governance structure in the indigo commodity chains, we 
thus need to look at if and how the forces interacting through Cain and Hopkins concept of 
gentlemanly capitalism, represented through the alliance of land and the wealth of the service 
sector, have had an advantage to overcome as well as reinforce all three of these barriers 
through the framework of Empire.  
 
An import aspect which is identified through all three types of barriers is the access to, and 
knowledge of, markets.
663
 Buyer specification of a product is most likely to arise when the 
buyer has a better understanding of the demands of the market, and therefore informs the 
supplier of what is required.
664
 It is important to keep in mind that the period under scrutiny 
can not be considered a market economy in the modern sense which is often associated with 
the driving forces of a self-regulating market.
665
 During the eighteenth and early nineteenth 
century, the indigo market was clearly subject to mercantilist regulations in the framework of 
Empire. Favourable access to markets was hereby created and provided through the 
machinery of the military fiscal state. Both Bengal and South Carolina indigo was subject to 
favourable trade policies and therefore overcame as well as reinforced the ‘political’ barrier of 
integration. It comes as no surprise that the leaders of the American war of independence 
were not to be found within the ranks of South Carolina planters.
666
 In fact, the indigo 
commodity chain almost came to a halt when South Carolina found itself outside the British 
Empire and in direct competition with other indigo producing regions such as Guatemala.
667
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In Bengal, the indigo industry’s very foundations built on support from the British 
government and its surrogate the EIC. The ‘political’ barrier was thus clearly a prominent 
factor within both chains and was re-enforced through the forces of Empire. 
 
The Empire also helped to greatly reduce cultural barriers throughout the indigo commodity 
chains. When reliable market institutions were weak or did not exist, economic actors 
preferred to rely on personal connections and co-ethnic and co-religious networks in order to 
avoid the risks of dealing with strangers.
668
 The indigo market in Bengal was entirely 
European in its character and local entrepreneurs were few, often marked by a general 
apprehensiveness stemming from a non-acquaintance of the market; evidence also suggests 
that they suffered of discrimination by European middleman.
669
 South Carolina on the other 
hand, which represented a settler society that strongly identified itself though shared 
conceptions of ‘Britishness’ and whose powerful agents were connected with the metropolitan 
elite in Britain, as well as with other parts of the Empire through an interlinked Atlantic 
economy, did not need buyer specifications. By the time Eliza Lucas Pinckney started 
experimenting with indigo in South Carolina she had spent her early years in the West Indies, 
had been educated in England and had lived briefly in Antigua. Her father, George Lucas, had 
been captain of a company in 1724, councillor of the island colony of Antigua in 1733 and 
was appointed lieutenant governor of Antigua in 1742.
670
 The Pinckney’s provide an excellent 
example of gentlemen (and women) abroad, forming a network of British people in what can 
be described as the notion of a ‘British World’, built on shared cultural, political, personal as 
well as official foundations.
671
 
 
It is interesting to note, that despite such strong connections enforced through the notion of a 
‘British economy’, South Carolina planters suffered continuously from the bad reputation of 
their indigo.
672
 This led to substantial economic losses but also fuelled sentiments that went 
beyond purely rational calculus: the quality and reputation of the commodities produced in 
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South Carolina represented important components in the construction of a collective 
provincial identity. South Carolina export commodities served as prove of the colonists’ 
adaptive expertise which transformed alien and savage environments into fertile land and 
refined places of civility.
673
 Hurt in their patriotic pride, colonists suspected that indigo’s 
reputation, good or bad, reflected the machinations of metropolitan merchants more than any 
stable use-value for colouring cloth.
674
 This indicates that shared cultural, political, personal 
and/or official foundations were interchangeable rather than fixed.
675
 After all, the American 
Revolution provides a powerful example for the potentially ambivalent relationships within 
such a ‘British world’. British planters in Bengal on the other hand were directly supported by 
the EIC which assured that their indigo was produced under the best possible conditions. 
While the quality of indigo is of course also subject to environmental conditions, the 
continuous experiments and support from the EIC indicate that the better quality and/or 
reputation of Bengal indigo can be related to the strong governance structure of the indigo 
commodity chain in Bengal. A letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor-general in 
Council in Bengal, dated the 11
th
 April 1785, states that: “Low qualities we desire may be 
avoided, as there is annually a great supply of Carolina indigo at low prices, which will 
answer the same purposes […]”.676 To have direct access to the EIC, which served as an agent 
of the military fiscal state abroad, therefore clearly had its benefits. Humphrey and Schmitz 
explain that producers that are connected to the ‘lead firms’ often find themselves on a steep 
learning curve: while lead firms are very demanding in regard to reducing costs, raising 
quality and increasing speed, they also transmit best practices and provide hands-on advice 
(and pressure) on how to improve layout, production flows and raise skills. Highly governed 
chains are often characterised by this combination of high challenge and high support, which 
also explains how relatively underdeveloped regions become major export producers in a 
short period of time.
677
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This gives insights into how the ‘informational’ barrier was overcome in the two commodity 
chains. In South Carolina the barrier was substantially weakened through the networks of 
British settlers and their connection to Britain. Access to the EIC as a ‘lead firm’ in Bengal 
however, which resulted in a highly governed indigo commodity chain, further decreased 
informational barriers. While the Pinckneys were able to send samples of indigo to London 
for elevation and consulted experienced dye makers to assist in the initial learning of the 
production of the dye, they had to do so on their own initiatives and through their own 
connections. At times they struggled, relying on dye makers such as Nicolas Comwell who 
made “[…] a great mystery of the process”.678 In Bengal, the British authorities themselves 
provided technical assistance on the production of indigo, writing letters of instructions and 
circulating detailed technical reports on the drawbacks of the dye compared to that of other 
indigo producing regions.
679
 This transfer of knowledge and technology introduced new 
models of organisation, labour discipline and management, imported from successful indigo 
producing regions such as Haiti.
680
 The ‘informational’ barrier does however go beyond the 
transfer of knowledge in regard to production, but also implies an awareness of market 
opportunities.
681
 The very introduction of indigo in South Carolina and Bengal stemmed from 
an awareness of the demand for indigo in Britain, fuelled by the expanding British textile 
industry.  
 
Forces of industrialisation in Britain thus had an indisputable influence over the very 
existence on both indigo commodity chains. Planters in South Carolina were in need of a 
second export staple and prided themselves on providing “[…] our mother country with a 
manufacture for which she has so great a demand […]”.682 The situation was a little more 
complex in Bengal, where demand as well as the need to remit profits back to Europe, drove 
the introduction of the crop. Chaudhuri reminds us that the rapid increase of indigo 
production in Bengal was a direct outcome of the remittance problem.
683
 Yet, it is important 
to note that the manufacturing interest in Britain not only had great demand of the dye, it also 
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resisted the import of finished products such as printed cotton goods from Bengal.
684
 On the 
one hand, indigo served the needs of gentlemanly capitalists to generate trading profits and 
remit them back to England, on the other hand, the power of the British textile lobby clearly 
advocates a certain degree of influence and agency to the manufacturing interest. This is an 
interesting example of the intertwined relationships between industry and service and shows 
that both profited from the two indigo commodity chains, which flourished through the 
framework of Empire and the resulting political, cultural and informational barriers of 
integration. What is important in regard to Cain and Hopkins’s analysis of British imperialism 
however is that it wasn’t industry that actively overcame these barriers but rather the forces of 
gentlemanly capitalism and the growing importance of the service sector therein, operating 
through the machinery of the British military fiscal state. In Bengal, the EIC as a vehicle for 
British gentleman acted as the lead firm in the indigo commodity chain and facilitated 
political, cultural and informational integration. In South Carolina, the gentlemanly diaspora 
which actively engaged in the service sector as well as in production, forged a link between 
Britain and the colony and overcame the said barriers. While both commodity chains’ very 
existence rested on the textile industry’s demand for the blue dye, it would be misleading to 
therefore conclude that it was industry which drove and controlled the two chains. In both 
cases control over the production of indigo, and thus governance of the two commodity 
chains, rested, albeit in different ways, on the forces of gentlemanly capitalism. This is in line 
with Cain and Hopkins argument, that the design of the British Empire was not dawn by 
industrialists and their interests were not paramount.
685
 In promoting their interests, agents of 
the service sector necessarily came into direct contact with potential clients, customers and 
producers in distant parts of the world in ways that British manufacturers did not: “not 
surprisingly, officers in the front line gathered much of the reconnaissance reaching London, 
passed on judgement about the suitability of foreign countries for the role assigned to them, 
and made recommendation on how they might be aligned to fit Britain’s international 
purpose.”686   
 
The City of London therefore represents the key node from which informational, political as 
well as cultural barriers were managed. It was home to the great institutions that supported the 
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Glorious as well as the Financial Revolution, featuring the Bank of England and the national 
debt.
687
 As the capital as well as the main port, London combined government finance with its 
pronounced overseas orientation.
688
 The City’s proximity to Parliament, to the departments of 
state and to the court, provided opportunities to access information and for influencing 
policies.
689
 Social integration, albeit a gradual process, was greatly helped by the affinities in 
life-styles of leading City figures and magnates at their meeting point in London.
690
 The 
growing integration of land and finance is illustrated well through the increasing employment 
of younger sons of aristocrats in the colonies throughout the second half of the eighteenth 
century, including placements arranged by the EIC.
691
 The deep involvement of the EIC in 
national politics in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century is thereby also shown by the 
need of the EIC’s Directors to create lucrative posts for the well connected out of the revenues 
of India.
692
 This resulted in an inflation of the Bengal service, often featuring young men with 
strong political connections, which grew from about 80 people in the 1750s to 286 in 1783.
693
 
When the Cornwallis reforms of the 1780s banned these company employees from engaging 
in private commercial activities, agency houses, which provided banking facilities as well as 
agency services, funnelled their capital, among other things, into indigo production.
694
 This 
further reinforced the ties between merchants and company servants. Cain and Hopkins 
remind us that “privileged information, from which large fortunes and high standing flowed, 
came principally from contact with those who controlled the machinery of state.”695 Private 
merchants, which operated through ‘sister’ firms in London, and company servants mingled 
in Calcutta, which became the hub of British trade and commerce in India, and provided a 
‘local’ outlet facilitating political, informational and cultural integration.696 From a 
commodity chain perspective, Calcutta therefore forms another critical node from which 
governance was exercised, albeit in continuous reference to London. As outlined in part II. 2. 
c., Brown et al. explain that commodity chains often run through local cities which are 
allocated near to production nodes and form critical links to major cities. Such major cities in 
turn may be distant from sites of production, but represent critical nodes from which 
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dispersed production sites are linked and eventually connected with sites of consumption.
697
 
The same pattern can be observed within the South Carolina indigo chain where Charleston 
provided a connection that joined together wealthy merchants and planters.
698
 The British 
communities in Calcutta and Charleston reduced cultural, informational and political barriers, 
which is powerfully illustrated through their quest to re-create spaces of ‘civility’ and 
maintain gentlemanly status.
699
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IV. Conclusion 
 
Both commodity chains could be continued and made longer as indigo made its way through 
London. This would give more insights into the relationship between the service sector and 
the manufactured interest in England itself. Industry and services were of course 
interdependent, and the City and provincial exporters co-operated to their mutual benefits.
700
 
Both chains do show however, that the manufactured interest in Britain operated on a local 
level, having limited influence over the commodity chains as they spanned beyond Britain to 
the Empire. The outline of the two indigo commodity chains in part III a. and b. already 
indicates that a substantial amount of agency is allocated within the service sector and the 
results of the analysis of gentlemanly capitalism in part III. c. are therefore not entirely 
surprising. What is substantial however is that the importance of the service sector is 
explicitly integrated within the governance structure of commodity chains. If emphasis is 
solemnly put on the production of a given commodity, reducing its distribution and finance to 
an auxiliary role, commodity chain analysis produces a distorted image of governance 
structures. This does not just represent a cosmetic flaw, but could seriously compromise the 
very aim of commodity chain research. Furthermore, this applies to all ‘types’ of commodity 
chains, including historical as well as contemporary chains. Whether they represent a holistic 
approach, that aims to outline the structure of the capitalist world economy, or a means to 
look at specific opportunities for participants to upgrade within a given chain, a thorough 
depiction of governance is necessary for an accurate analysis.  
 
This is not to imply that previous research has ignored services as an integral component of 
the functioning of commodity chains which, by their very nature, provide an analytical tool to 
analyse trade. I agree with Topik et al. when they explain that: “The great merit of the global 
commodity chain approach, as we see it, is in expanding the vision of economic historians 
and students of international relations in general to encompass both the production and 
consumption ends of commodity chains as well as many intervening steps of processing, 
transportation, and marketing.”701 Cain and Hopkins have outlined however that traditional 
accounts of economic development are often marked by industry-centric approaches: an 
under-emphasise of non-industrial forms of capitalism is therefore deeply embedded within 
economic history and economists ranging from Smith to Kaldor have viewed services as 
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inferior to the process of production.
702
 Consequently, it is not surprising that chain research 
also shows a tendency to focus on production. Yet, this study aimed to demonstrate that 
commodity chains provide a suitable political economy tool for an analysis of gentlemanly 
capitalism beyond regional restrictions and through a tangible product, incorporating the 
interrelated spheres of production and that of services into the analysis. Gereffi himself 
explains that a GCC approach provides a suitable tool “[…] to critically evaluate theoretical 
concepts that have hitherto prevailed in the comparative study of development”.703 Chain 
research therefore has the capabilities of test the gentlemanly capitalism paradigm as well as 
to overcome industry-centric views of development and firmly integrate services within its 
analysis. In order to do so however it is necessary to explicitly refer to their importance in 
terms of governance within commodity chains.   
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VI. Appendix  
 
VI. a.  Deutsche Zusammenfassung: 
  
Es ist unbestreitbar, dass die Industrielle Revolution die Wirtschaftsgeschichte 
Großbritanniens, sowie weltweite Prozesse der Entwicklung, maßgeblich geprägt hat. Cain 
und Hopkins sind allerdings der Ansicht, dass durch die Konzentration auf industrielles 
Wachstum ein verzerrtes Bild von Großbritanniens Aufstieg zur Weltmacht, wie auch von 
moderner wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung entstanden ist, welches die wesentliche Bedeutung 
von finanziellen Dienstleistungen und Handel untergräbt. Ihr Konzept des ‚Gentleman-
Kapitalismus’, das eine Verbindung der britischen Aristokratie mit dem Reichtum des 
dortigen Dienstleistungssektor darstellt, gibt eine differenzierte Einsicht in die Macht- und 
Profitverhältnisse der ersten industriellen Nation. Ziel der vorliegenden Studie ist es, eine 
Methode zu etablieren, welche die Theorie des ‚Gentleman-Kapitalismus’ auf systemische 
Weise und anhand von spezifischen Fallbeispielen hinterfragt, und daher eine vergleichende 
Analyse, die nicht an zeitliche und örtliche Einschränkungen gebunden ist, erlaubt. Es wird 
argumentiert, dass der Güterkettenansatz, soweit er seinen Analyserahmen ausdehnt um 
Dienstleistungen dezidiert zu integrieren, diese Art von Analyse anhand eines konkreten 
Produktes ermöglichen kann. Eine solche Erweiterung dient auch der Güterkettenforschung 
selbst, welche ähnlich der britischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte dazu tendiert, sich hauptsächlich 
auf Prozesse der Produktion zu konzentrieren. Das ist jedoch problematisch: Da ein wichtiges 
Ziel der Güterkettenforschung darin liegt Machtstrukturen, also Governance zu untersuchen, 
sollten Dienstleistungen, welche zu den profitabelsten Aktivitäten in Güterketten gehören und 
in vieler Hinsicht Produktionsprozesse koordinieren, einen integralen Bestandteil der Analyse 
darstellen. Mittlerweile sprechen sich schon einige Publikationen für eine Integration von 
Dienstleistungen in Güterketten aus. Diese betonen aber meist deren ansteigende Bedeutung 
in den letzten Jahrzehnten und reihen sich somit in die konventionelle industrieorientierte 
Entwicklungstheorie ein. Am Beispiel Indigo in historischen Güterketten aus South Carolina 
und Bengalen möchte ich die Bedeutung von Dienstleistungen im Britischen Imperium und 
die Möglichkeiten des Güterkettenansatzes aufzeigen.  
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VI. b. English Abstract: 
 
It is indisputable that the Industrial Revolution is of central importance to the economic 
history of Britain, thereafter influencing processes of development worldwide. Cain and 
Hopkins argue however, that an emphasis on industrial growth has produced a somewhat 
biased history of modern economic development, somewhat neglecting the role of finance and 
commercial services in the analysis of Britain’s rise to hegemony and the causes of her 
overseas expansion. Their concept of ‘gentlemanly capitalism’, which represents a synthesis 
of the landed aristocracy with the wealth of the service sector, proposes a different perspective 
on power and profitability within the first industrial nation. This study tries to establish a 
systemic way to test the gentlemanly capitalism paradigm against specific case studies in 
order to allow for comparative analysis that overcomes temporal and spatial restrictions. It is 
argued that, if the concept of commodity chains is modified to firmly integrate services, it 
provides a suitable political economy tool for an analysis of services through the production 
and distribution of a tangible product. This works twofold: like British economic history, 
commodity chains have a tendency to focus on production. This study argues that since the 
commodity chains approach aims to outline governance structures within a given chain, 
services, which essentially coordinate production processes and represent some of the most 
profitable activities within commodity chains, should form an integral part of the analysis. 
There is a growing recognition that services should be integrated within commodity chains, 
but this discourse is almost exclusively restricted to what is perceived as their growing 
importance within the last few decades and thus is in line with conventional industry-centric 
approaches to theories of development. The example of two historic indigo commodity chains 
from South Carolina and Bengal, demonstrate the importance of services in the British 
Empire as well as the capabilities of the commodity chain approach to illustrate such.  
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